

# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

## **MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**



## **THESIS**

**AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE  
MILITARY (NAVY) PERSONNEL PLANS  
AND POLICY DIVISION (N13)**

by

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September 1998

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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is a descriptive organization analysis of N13, the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy Division. The purpose of the study was to describe the strategy, structure, processes, tasks, people, and culture of N13 using three models: the Systems model, the Configuration model, and, the Mintzberg model. Based on model comparisons, document reviews, semi-structured interviews and questionnaire responses of N13 leaders and managers, conclusions indicate that N13 is severely stressed due to personnel reductions and a partial relocation of BUPERS to Millington, Tennessee. N13 is struggling to cope with fast-changing 1990s problems using a post Cold War, Political-Reactive configuration. Recommendations are offered to assist leaders and managers in making systematic change to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of N13 as well as the manpower and personnel system. Specific recommendations include: realignment to a team-based community approach vice the current fragmented and duplicative approach; divestiture of non-core areas; and creation of a realistic training program tailored to rapidly enhance individual knowledge and skill sets.



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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ACIP	Aircrew Incentive Pay
ACP	Aircrew Pay
ADDU	Additional Duty
AMD	Activity Manpower Document
BA	Billets Authorized
BAH	Basic Allowance for Housing
BAS	Basic Allowance for Subsistence
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
BUPERS	Bureau of Naval Personnel
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CNA	Center for Naval Analysis
CNATRA	Chief of Naval Air Training
CNET	Chief of Naval Education and Training
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNP	Chief of Naval Personnel
CNRC	Commander, Naval Recruiting Command
COB	Current Onboard
COLA	Cost of Living Allowance
COMNAVPERSCOM	Commander, Naval Personnel Command
COMNAVRESFOR	Commander Naval Reserve Force
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DoD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
DPG	Defense Planning Guide

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

EB	Enlistment Bonus
ECM	Enlisted Community Manager
EDPROJ	Enlisted Distributable Projections
EDVR	Enlisted Distribution and Verification Report
EPMAC	Enlisted Personnel Management Center
EPRES	Enlisted Personnel Requisition System
FITREP	Fitness Report
FSA	Family Separation Allowance
FSO	Fleet Support Officer
FMB	Director, Office of Budget
FMD	Fleet Manpower Document
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
MFT	Mission, Functions, and Tasks
MC	Manpower Claimant
MCA	Manning Control Authority
MRC	Manpower Resource Code
NAVMAC	Navy Manpower and Analysis Center
NEC	Naval Enlisted Classification
NITRAS	Navy Integrated Training Resource and Administration System
NMP	Navy Manning Plan
NOIP	Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay
NPRST	Naval Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Center
OCM	Officer Community Manager
ODPROJ	Officer Distributable Projections
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPA/EPA	Officer and Enlisted Programmed Authority

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PEP	Personnel Exchange Program (PEP)
POE	Projected Operating Environment
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
POM	Programmed Objectives Memorandum
RAD	Resource Allocation Display
RL	Restricted Line Officer
ROC	Required Operations Capability
SMC	Sub-Manpower Claimants
SMD	Ship Manning Document
SMRDP	Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Process
SQMD	Squadron Manning Document
SPP	Sponsor Program Proposals
SRB	Selective Reenlistment Bonus
SSB	Selective Separation Bonus
SSC	Subspecialty Code
TERA	Temporary Early Retirement Authority
TFMMS	Total Force Manpower Management System
TLA	Temporary Lodging Allowance
URL	Unrestricted Line Officer
VSI	Voluntary Separation Incentive
WINPAT	Windows Program Analysis Toolkit



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First and foremost I would like to thank the outstanding people of N13 who graciously put up with me for a week. Without their helpfulness and honest remarks this thesis would not have been possible. I want to make it clear that the findings of this thesis are not focused on individual faults, but rather on system problems. The outstanding leadership and quality of personnel in N13 was readily apparent during my short visit.

I would also like to acknowledge Dan Packer, a good friend and sounding board for many of my ideas. A heartfelt thanks to Erik Jansen for getting me pointed in the right direction, and to Cary Simon, for a tremendous effort in the development of this thesis. Last, but not least, I am forever grateful for the support of my dear wife, Bobbie, and three fantastic sons, John, Sam, and Steve.



## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. OVERVIEW**

The Navy's Manpower and Personnel system is currently undergoing a great deal of stress and change. The 1990s personnel drawdown has created a strain on the system, exhibited externally through changes to the fleet billet structure which must be managed by the manpower and personnel system, and internally manifested in the corresponding increase in workload of the remaining personnel.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) committee decision to relocate the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) to Millington, Tennessee has splintered the organization as several agencies have remained behind in Washington D.C.

This purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of N13, the Military (Navy) Personnel Plans and Policy Division, an organization greatly affected by these events. N13 has a major impact on fleet manning and individual sailors, and faces the considerable challenge of formulating and implementing innovative solutions while under numerous constraints. Attention is currently focused on N13 as recruiting and retention difficulties have contributed to a predicted FY98 Navy End strength shortfall.<sup>2</sup> Solutions that have been applied in the past (more money and personnel) are no longer readily available and N13 must now look at other ways to solve emerging issues and reoccurring problems. This analysis uses several models to view N13 from different perspectives and provide a framework for making systematic change.

### **B. METHODOLOGY**

This thesis uses a four-step approach to analyzing N13. First, relevant organizational and management literature is reviewed to provide the tools necessary for the analysis. Next, a context

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<sup>1</sup> Since 1989, the United States Navy has reduced Active Duty end strength by 36 percent, reducing manning by almost 200,000 Sailors.

<sup>2</sup> The N13 Enlisted Strength Planner predicts that the Navy will come in 5,000 below FY98 congressionally mandated end strength. This is largely due to CNRC's predicted shortfall of about 7,000 accessions.

for understanding the N13 organization is provided through a description of the manpower and personnel system. A detailed, current description of N13 is conducted. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for improvements are provided based on model comparisons, document reviews, questionnaire responses, and personal interviews. The methodology is summarized follows:

- (1) An organizational design and management literature review was conducted.
- (2) An overview of the manpower and personnel system was conducted based on:
  - Semi-structured interviews
  - Briefing documents
  - Training course documents
  - Organizational literature
- (3) N13 was described based on:
  - Briefings and literature specific to N13.
  - 7 Enlisted Community Manager (ECM) responses to a formal questionnaire
  - 16 semi-structured interviews with N13 leaders and managers.
- (4) N13 was analyzed based on document reviews, interviews, and comparisons to three models:
  - Mintzberg's model: Defines the basic shape of an organization.
  - Systems model: Views all the organizational components holistically.
  - Configuration model: Places an organization into one of four basic types based on extent or focus on efficiency and effectiveness.

### **C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY**

The analysis of N13 depicts an organization stressed due to personnel reductions and a partial relocation of BUPERS to Millington, Tennessee. The study points out how N13 is struggling to cope with fast-changing 1990s problems using a post Cold War, Political-Reactive configuration. The study describes organizational problems and offers a systematic approach for change. Specific areas for improvement are also discussed as a starting point for dialogue in N13 and the manpower and personnel system. For example, the need for strategic thinking and

communication of a meaningful strategy for change linked to direct actions is discussed. Realignment to a team-based, community approach, vice the current fragmented and duplicative approach, might yield more concentrated focus on problem solving. Additionally, the creation of a realistic training program for carefully selected incoming personnel would improve organizational learning and performance. The most far-reaching benefit is for a genuine discussion to emerge centered on achievable transformation for N13 and other challenged organizations.

#### **D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS**

Chapter II discusses the organizational theory and models used as the basis for analysis. Chapter III provides the necessary context for readers unfamiliar with the manpower and personnel system. Chapter IV describes the N13 organization. Chapter V uses the models discussed in Chapter II and the organizational description in Chapter IV. Chapter VI discusses the major conclusions and provides recommendations for N13 and Navy manpower and personnel leadership.



## **II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MODELS**

The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation of organizational theory and explain a Systems model and a Configuration model to management, which will be used to analyze N13 in Chapters V and VI. Mintzberg's organizational theory proposes basic structural designs and coordinating mechanisms of organizations. The Systems model builds on this by viewing an organization as the product of a group of interacting factors and elements. Next, a Configuration model, based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in public sector organizations, is described. Finally, some organizational change considerations are proposed.


### **A. MINTZBERG'S ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY**

Henry Mintzberg offers a comprehensive explanation of how organizations evolve into a certain form and shape. This "structure" is an adaptive mechanism that permits the organization to function in its surroundings. He proposes that organizations are composed of five main parts, as shown in **Figure (2-1)**.<sup>3</sup>

1. **Operating Core:** Workers at the base of an organization performing the basic work.
2. **Strategic Apex:** Personnel charged with ensuring organizational effectiveness, oversight, and direction for the entire system.
3. **Middle Line:** Managers linking the strategic apex to the operating core. Middle managers comprise organizational hierarchy.
4. **Technostructure:** Analysts planning and controlling the work of others. They may design the work, plan it, or train the people who do it, but they typically do not do the work themselves.
5. **Support Staff:** The support staff provides services to enable accomplishment of the basic mission. The support staff is not directed towards providing advice, as is the technostructure, rather its function is to assist other organizational components.

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<sup>3</sup> Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations*, Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1992, p. 11.



**Figure 2-1.** Mintzberg's Basic Model of an Organization

The small strategic apex is connected by a flaring middle line to a large, flat operating core at the base. These three parts are drawn in an uninterrupted sequence to indicate that they are connected as a single line of authority. The technostructure and support staff are shown off to either side to indicate that they are not a part of the main line of authority, and tend to influence the operating core indirectly.<sup>4</sup>

The parts of the organization require a means of coordinating work, based on the complexity. There are five mechanisms proposed to explain the various ways organizations may coordinate work.

- **Mutual adjustment:** Achieves coordination of work by the process of informal communication between employees.
- **Direct supervision:** Achieves coordination by having one person take responsibility for the work of others.
- **Standardization of work processes:** Standardized when the contents of work are specified.

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<sup>4</sup>Henry Mintzberg, *Mintzberg on Management*, The Free Press: New York 1989, pp 98-99.

- **Standardization of work output:** Standardized when the results of the work are specified.
- **Standardization of skills and knowledge:** Standardized when the kind of training required to perform the work is specified.

These five mechanisms manifest themselves in a rough order. Mutual adjustment works in simplest and least complex forms. Organizations cannot rely on just one of these mechanisms and many use all five.<sup>5</sup> As work becomes increasingly complex, an organization may use various combinations of these mechanisms. Organizations also rely on coordinating mechanisms to link individual and group efforts: (1) vertically, through commands, supervision, policies, rules, planning or control systems; and (2) laterally, through meetings, task forces, standing committees, or special coordinating roles. Vertical coordination is more formal in that managers control and coordinate work of subordinates. It is most prevalent when organizational environments are stable and tasks are predictable. Lateral coordination is more informal, in that workers at similar levels coordinate among themselves. This type of coordination dominates when organizational environments are turbulent and tasks are complex.<sup>6</sup>

By varying the emphasis on certain parts of the organizational structure and the means of coordination, five different types of structures have been proposed by Mintzberg based primarily on structure and coordination: simple structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form, and adhocracy. In each configuration, a different coordinating mechanism is dominant, a different part of the organization plays the key role, and a different type of control is used. **Table (2-1)** summarizes the key differences.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Muchinsky, *Psychology Applied to Work*, (Brooks/Cole Publishing Company: Pacific Grove, California, 1997), p.254.

<sup>6</sup> Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, *Reframing Organizations*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1991, p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives*, 1995, p. 153.

<b>Structural Configuration</b>	<b>Prime Coordinating Mechanism</b>	<b>Key Part of Organization</b>	<b>Type of Control</b>
Simple Structure	Direct Supervision	Strategic Apex	Vertical and horizontal centralization
Machine Bureaucracy	Standardization of work processes	Technostructure	Limited horizontal decentralization
Professional Bureaucracy	Standardization of skills	Operating Core	Vertical and horizontal decentralization
Divisionalized Form	Standardization of outputs	Middle Line	Limited vertical decentralization
Adhocracy	Mutual adjustment	Support staff or operating core	Selective decentralization

**Table 2-1:** Summary of Mintzberg's Configurations

## B. SYSTEMS MODEL

A systems approach looks at a set of organizational attributes (e.g. environment, mission, task, structure, technology, etc.) rather than individual attributes.<sup>8</sup> The analysis in this thesis relies heavily on the Systems model shown in **Figure (2-2)**.<sup>9</sup> This model was derived from a similar model developed at Harvard Business School to define an organization as a system of interacting components. The Systems model begins with the contextual factors impacting organizations, then considers the various design variables influencing output and outcomes.

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<sup>8</sup> Nancy Roberts, "Public Deliberations: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," *Public Administration Review*, 1997.

<sup>9</sup> Nancy Roberts, "The Systems Model," Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished, 1998.

## The Systems Model




Figure 2-2. The Systems Model (Source: Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998.)

## **1. Context**

The model begins by examining the organization's context. According to Nadler and Tushman, the context comprises the elements that make up the "givens" facing an organization. These "givens" include:<sup>10</sup>

- Environment: Factors outside the organization such as individuals, groups, or other organizations that affect how the organization performs. The environment also includes the political, economic, social, and technological influences. When analyzing an organization, one must consider the factors in the environment and how they create demands, constraints, or opportunities.
- Resources: The assets an organization has at its disposal such as employees, technology, capital, and information.
- History: How the organization is influenced by its past is another element of context. It is important to understand the major stages in an organization's development, as well as the current impacts of past events.

## **2. Key Success Factors**

What factors are required for the organization to be successful? Management must ask sufficient questions to ascertain the requirements essential for success. Each organization will have different success factors depending on its existing context. Key success factors for public sector organizations are likely to be more numerous and perhaps more ambiguous than for private, for-profit organizations.<sup>11</sup>

## **3. System Direction**

The next step is for the organization to determine the direction/strategy for the system. Management should determine this based on the context and success factors. The type of direction

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<sup>10</sup> David Nadler and Michael Tushman, *Strategic Organizational Design*. Scott Foresman, and Company: Glenview, Illinois, 1988, p. 22p. 22-24.

<sup>11</sup> John Bryson, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p. 291.

will vary depending on the type of organization. For example, some may issue top-down directives and specific goals, while others will issue vision statements or guiding principles.

#### 4. Design Factors

Design factors refer to individual organizational components, i.e., tasks, technology, structure, people, and processes/subsystems. Congruence among these design factors is often critical for organizational success.

- *Tasks:* The nature of the work, the specification and differentiation required, are key factors when designing tasks. The assessment of the fit of other components depends to a large degree on an understanding of the nature of the tasks to be performed.
- *Technology:* Technology is the process by which an organization converts inputs into outputs.<sup>12</sup> It also includes the interdependencies among the activities and individuals involved in the work flow as well as the physical facilities and equipment. Information systems, while commonly assumed to be part of the technology, are not included in this component.
- *Structure:* Structure is the basic groupings of activities and people. This includes the basic shape and coordinating mechanisms and also refers to integrating devices (i.e. hierarchy, task force, integrating roles and departments, matrix, networks) that are used to coordinate between the various groupings.
- *People:* The knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) of the people are an important design factor. This also refers to the demographic background and experience of the workers.
- *Process/Subsystems:* This design factor refers to:
  1. Human Resource Management (HRM): Human Resource policies and programs produce the talent that is required by the strategy and structure of the organization, generating the skills and mind-sets necessary to implement its

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<sup>12</sup> Daniel Robey, *Designing Organizations, A Macro Perspective*, Richard Irwin, Inc.: Homewood, Illinois, 1982, p. 98.

chosen direction.<sup>13</sup> HRM deals with the selection, training, and development of the people to meet the needs of the organization. How people are rewarded is also part of HRM. The purpose of the reward system is to align the goals of the employee with the goals of the organization.

2. Measurement and Controls, Financial Management: These are the mechanisms designed to hold individuals accountable for behavior and resources. This also includes performance measures and budgetary controls.
3. Planning, Communication and Information Management: This process deals with how the organization gathers, processes, distributes, and evaluates information. This is where the information systems fit into an organization's design.

## 5. Culture

The culture of an organization is an important factor to consider when analyzing an organization. Culture pertains to the prevalent norms and values found in a system. One definition of culture is “a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and integration- that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore has to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to their problems.”<sup>14</sup> Another more succinct definition is “the way we do things around here.”<sup>15</sup> In a systems approach, culture must be analyzed in terms of whether it impedes or facilitates integration of effort within an organization.

## 6. Outputs and Outcomes

The organization’s output refers to the things that the organization offers in terms of goods and services. It is a measure of how well an organization meets its objectives and utilizes resources. The output is often based on the method of measurement and is typically the performance indicator

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<sup>13</sup> Jay Galbraith, *Designing Organizations*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> E. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1985.

<sup>15</sup> M. Bower, *The Will To Manage: Corporate Success Through Programmed Management*, McGraw-Hill: New York, 1966.

for an organization. Outcomes deal with the implications and consequences that outputs have on stakeholders and how the outputs are interpreted in view of the environment. In order to be an integrated system, the outcomes must feedback to the environment and also to the design factors.

A Systems model is useful when analyzing organizations because it shows the interrelationship between all the factors that influence an organization. The systems approach assumes that an organization can only be understood by looking at the sum of all parts and at the level of congruence between them. Congruence is the degree to which the system components interact and create interdependence between the parts. The parts of an organization can fit well together and function effectively, or they can fit poorly and lead to problems, dysfunction, and poor performance. The basic hypothesis of the congruence model is that organizations will be more effective the greater the congruence or fit between the major components.<sup>16</sup>

### C. CONFIGURATION MODEL

Organizations can be categorized into various configurations based on different criteria. In this context, configuration refers to organizational attributes (e.g. environment, strategy, structure, tasks) that fall into a coherent pattern. Nancy Roberts has developed a Configuration model for public sector organizations based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in the organization.<sup>17</sup> (A study on public and private sector organizations is beyond the scope of this thesis. Management cannot necessarily apply private sector management principles to the public sector to ensure success.<sup>18</sup>) A Configuration model is especially applicable to public sector organizations, such as N13, that are designed to fulfill missions, meet numerous mandates, and satisfy diverse constituents.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Nadler and Tushman, *Strategic Organizational Design*. Scott Foresman, and Company, 1988, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> Nancy Roberts, "Organizational Configuration: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management," 1998, pp. 4-5.

<sup>18</sup> P. Nutt and R. Backoff, Strategic Management of Public and Third Sector Organizations," Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1992, pp. 22-23

<sup>19</sup> John Bryson,, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995. p ix.

## **1. Efficiency vs. Effectiveness**

Efficiency refers to the capacity to produce results with the minimum expenditure of time, money, or materials. It focuses on getting things done quicker and cheaper by refining and standardizing processes. Organizations based primarily on efficiency tend to survive best only when change is slow or predictable.

Effectiveness is “bringing about a desired result.” Managers must rely on adaptation to react to changes in the environment. Innovation is needed to effectively adapt to change and meet emergent needs of the organization and its stakeholders. Organizations with a high degree of effectiveness often ignore costs and time, and tend to function best under rapid change.


Both effectiveness and efficiency are necessary in public sector performance, but each tends to interfere with the other. Efficiency tends to drive out change and innovation as it depends on repetition and precision. On the other hand, effectiveness thrives on exploration and experimentation.<sup>20</sup>

## **2. Public Sector Configurations**

Depending on the level of effectiveness and efficiency, organizations fall into one of four configurations as shown in **Figure (2-3)**. An understanding of each of these four managerial approaches provides a blueprint of where an organization is currently located and can also guide management in choosing a new direction.

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<sup>20</sup> Roberts, N., 1998, pp. 5-6.



**Figure 2-3.** Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management

*a. Directive Configuration*

The Directive Configuration is designed for higher levels of efficiency and lower levels of effectiveness. These highly centralized organizations try to minimize disturbances to the process and focus on becoming a “well-oiled machine.” This results in little discretion left to the workers due to high levels of standardization and formalization. The key in this organization is the technostucture, which works to standardize processes. The role of the leader is to be the strategic planner and controller of the organization who issues top-down directives when faced with changing routines or procedures.

*b. Adaptive Configuration*

The Adaptive Configuration is the polar opposite of the Directive Configuration. Where, the Directive Configuration is concerned primarily with efficiency and performance, the Adaptive Configuration places its major emphasis on effectiveness and problem solving. This is a very flexible structure with few formalized rules for behavior. This configuration relies on a

decentralized group of experts who often work in teams responding directly to customer needs. Coordination is provided through mutual adjustment between the experts. The role of the leader is to be the champion of innovation. They must rely on a general vision of the future rather than on specific goals and objectives. They must be masters of human relations, able to use persuasion, negotiation, coalition, reputation and rapport to fuse the individualistic experts into smoothly functioning teams.<sup>21</sup> Research and Development organizations are examples of Adaptive configurations.

### *c. Political/Reactive Configuration*

The Political/Reactive organization resolves the tension between efficiency and effectiveness by reducing the pressure on both. This results in an inconsistent and disjointed pattern of activity developed in response to meeting the needs of the moment. At times it strives to be efficient while at others to be effective, often leaving workers and stakeholders confused. The leadership, acting in the role of “firefighter,” fails to provide coherent, integrated policies to guide the organization as a whole because it is responding to short-term demands. Their success depends on the ability to get the organization to react in a timely and appropriate way to whatever is required of it.<sup>22</sup> As these organizations get pushed and pulled in various directions by stakeholders, the leader is often unable to develop a vision or even goals. The successful workers and managers are those with skills in crisis management, bargaining and negotiating, coalition formation, power analysis, and the ability to build and sustain a power base.

This organization responds to stakeholder interests one at a time, depending on who has the strongest influence. Plans and policies are made in response to certain events or crises, which results in an inability to look to the future and plan coherently and logically. The work in a Political/Reactive organization is based more on personal relationships than on a formalized set of rules and procedures. Change is usually the result of a political decision that sets a new course.

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<sup>21</sup> Henry Mintzberg, *Mintzberg on Management*, p. 206.

<sup>22</sup> Nancy Roberts, "Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," 1997, p. 125.

Inter-organizational coordination is minimal in this type of organization. This produces a structure with little intentional compatibility among structure, tasks, technology, training, information systems, and rewards. The organization is not evaluated on a specific output, but on how well it appears to respond to its primary stakeholder/ political authority.

This configuration is very common in public sector organizations, which are not driven by competition and profit. Without a specific purpose or challenge, these organizations often fall into the trap of responding to “crises” rather than developing a corporate vision. Organization members fall into the same trap by “just trying to survive.” Some compare the decision process that results from these interactions to a “garbage-can” where problems, solutions, decision-makers, and choice opportunities are thrown together as independent streams linked by their simultaneity in time and not by any logic or order.<sup>23</sup> Stakeholder relationships are either a one-on-one reactionary relationship, or they are coalition-based for the purpose of manipulating interests and achieving a political end.

#### *d. Generative Configuration*

The Generative Configuration is seen as the organization of the future. It has been described as the “new management paradigm.”<sup>24</sup> It seeks to resolve the effectiveness-efficiency paradox and strives toward high levels of both. This is a relatively new area of organizational design research, and while some organizations have made inroads in defining this organization, there is still a great deal of speculation as to what the final form or forms will be.

Managers in this configuration must rely on collaborations with both internal and external stakeholders to address common paradoxes such as short and long-run perspectives; global and local considerations; individual and collective needs; social and economic concerns; security and freedom; change and stability; diversity and commonality of purpose.<sup>25</sup> Collaboration is the process of decision-making among many interdependent parties. It allows organizations to work and learn across organizational structures requiring joint ownership of decisions and collective responsibility

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<sup>23</sup> M. Cohen, March, and Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17.

<sup>24</sup> A. Levine and J. Luck, *The New Management Paradigm: A Review of Principles and Practices*, 1994.

<sup>25</sup> Nancy Roberts, “Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management,” p. 17

for outcomes. Collaborations are the key to attaining efficiency and effectiveness simultaneously. Effectiveness is the result of getting stakeholders to pursue common goals, while efficiencies come from stakeholders pursuing common means.<sup>26</sup> These collaborations are established to leverage intellect and promote “generative” learning. Generative learning is the ability to create new solutions to old problems rather than settle for adaptive learning which is merely finding a way to cope with new situations. This type of learning can only be accomplished through open dialogue with all the stakeholders.

The leader in this organization assumes the role of steward, teacher, and designer. The leadership starts with the principle of “creative tension.” Creative tension comes from seeing where the organization wants to be, “the vision,” and telling the truth about where the organization is now, the “current reality.” This tension can be solved in one of two ways: by raising current reality toward the vision or by lowering the vision toward current reality. Leading through creative tension is different than solving problems. In problem solving, the energy for change comes from attempting to get away from an aspect of current reality that is undesirable. With creative tension, the energy for change comes from the vision.<sup>27</sup> This is a subtle, but important, distinction. The leader then uses his various roles to create an environment where the stakeholders can work toward reaching this vision through generative learning.

#### *e. Hybrids*

Public sector organizations tend to fall into one of the four configurations, or a “hybrid” of these types. A hybrid occurs when an organization positions itself towards the center of the continuum, varying the degree of efficiency and effectiveness. Research has shown that hybrids, in general, are less effective than “pure bred” configurations.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Jeanne Liedtka, “Collaborating Across Lines of Business for Competitive Advantage,” p. 21.

<sup>27</sup> Peter Senge, “The Leader’s New Work: Building Learning Organizations,” p. 9.


<sup>28</sup> Roberts, 1998, pp. 29-30.

## D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS

Organizations routinely undergo change, however, the nature, scope, and intensity of change varies. Organizational change is a complex issue that should be thoroughly analyzed prior to undertaking. Implementation methods are beyond the scope of this thesis, however, this section looks at the various types of change as well as considerations for managers faced with implementing organizational change.

### 1. Types of Change

Management should use the previously discussed principle of “creative tension” to determine the type of change that may be required. Strategic, or radical change has an impact on the whole system of the organization and ends up fundamentally redefining the organization in terms of its design factors. Incremental change is change that aims to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of the organization, but within the general framework of the existing organizational design. Change is also either reactive or anticipatory. Changes that are in direct response to an external event are reactive. Anticipatory change is done when management believes that making a change will benefit the organization. Combining the two dimensions produces a typology of different types of changes as shown in **Figure (2-4).**<sup>29</sup>



**Figure 2-4.** Types of Organizational Change

<sup>29</sup> Mohrman and others, *Large-Scale Organizational Change*, 1989, p. 102.

Change that is incremental and anticipatory is called tuning. These changes are minor adjustments to the system made in anticipation of future events. Strategic change initiated in anticipation of future events is called reorientation. Reactive change instituted incrementally is called adaptation; instituted strategically is called re-creation.<sup>30</sup>

## **2. Change Considerations**

Nadler and Tushman contend that the role of leadership varies considerably depending on the type of change. Most incremental changes can be managed within the existing organizational system. However, in the case of strategic changes, the management process and structure itself is the subject of change, so it cannot be solely relied on to manage the change.<sup>31</sup>

The systems model can be used as a starting point for management to appraise the current reality of their organization. It can also be used to build a vision for the future. The difficulty lies in the transition stage between the present and future. A plan must be made that takes into account the entire system. Any of the system variables can be manipulated to produce change in an organization. The congruence model must be applied to all system components because a change in one factor will almost always have an affect on the others.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p. 101.


<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p. 103

### III. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVY MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL SYSTEM

This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall framework for understanding a complex manpower and personnel system, and to set the stage for analyzing the N13 organization. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the process by which money is allocated in the Department of Defense (DoD), is discussed because the allocation of resources is a principle driving force behind Navy manpower and personnel. Second, manpower processes are described in terms of how they define and finance an activity's billet requirements. The personnel system completes the process and results in individuals physically occupying billets. After discussing the basic processes involved, each of the major manpower and personnel organizations are described.

#### A. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)

The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is an iterative planning and control process consisting of three distinct but interrelated phases. Prior to PPBS there was no integrated process within DoD for systematically consolidating, reviewing, and analyzing Service programs. Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, established the PPBS in 1961 because it was difficult to relate budgets to military missions. The output of the PPBS is a comprehensive plan by which budgets are developed from programs, requirements, strategies, and national security objectives (threats) as shown in Figure (3-1).




Source: Derived from Manpower, Personnel, and Training R& D Project Officers Guide, 1994

Figure 3-1. Steps in the PPBS Process 21

PPBS is essentially a decision-making process for allocating limited resources (money) among many competing requirements. These requirements include manpower, technology, hardware, support and maintenance, procurement, and construction. PPBS differs from a traditional budgeting process in that rather than focusing on the existing base and annual incremental improvements, PPBS was intended to focus more on objectives and purposes. The system also brings together planning and budgeting by means of programming, a process through which plans are converted into time-phased and fiscally oriented programs.<sup>32</sup> Its three primary purposes are to:

- ensure national defense resources are allocated in a manner that produces the best possible military force to meet mission needs;
  - produce a realistic and responsible plan that extends more than one year into the future;
  - produce a viable budget in the context of that plan.<sup>33</sup>

The PPBS process operates year-round with each of the three components of the process occurring simultaneously. PPBS is not a linear process, but an overlapping set of mechanisms for assessment, review, and decision focused on providing all DoD warfighting forces with the best mix of personnel, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints. **Figure (3-2)** illustrates the major PPBS milestones.<sup>34</sup>



### **Figure 3-2. Major PPBS Milestones**

<sup>32</sup> Manpower, Personnel, and Training R&D Project Officers Guide, October 1994.

<sup>33</sup> Manpower Fundamentals, An Indoctrination Course for CNO (N12) Personnel, p.18.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas Simcik, "Reengineering the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Process," Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, p. 9.

## **1. Planning Phase**

Planning, the first phase of PPBS, examines the military posture of the United States in light of national security objectives and resource limitations. The primary functions in this phase include collecting intelligence about the military capabilities and intentions of foreign countries; evaluating national security threats; developing strategies to meet threats; and devising force levels to support strategies. The major steps in Navy planning are:

- assess the current national security environment related to Naval forces;
- determine Naval strategy and force levels;
- develop force planning guidance.

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) becomes the final product of the planning phase and the foundation for the programming phase. While defense planning is continuous and iterative, the DPG "freezes" planning to enable construction of the Programmed Objectives Memorandums (POMs).

## **2. The Programming Phase**

Programming is the process by which information in the DPG is translated into a financial plan of effective and achievable programs. During the programming phase, resources are allocated within the Department of the Navy (DON) based on: (1) an assessment of warfare requirements, (2) consensus of high level personnel within DON, and (3) guidance by plans and policy decisions. The Programming phase results in a mid-range plan through the development of the POM, the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and the Resource Allocation Display (RAD). A description of these programming documents follows.

### *a. Programming Documents*

**(1) The Programmed Objective Memorandum (POM).** The POM is a detailed, six fiscal year program-specific outline of how the Navy intends to spend its money and allocate manpower. It covers the objectives, planned activities, and cost of each program. The first

two years of the POM form the baseline for creation of service budgets. The POM highlights the first two years of the six years being programmed. For example, the information in POM 98-99 will be used as a baseline for the 99-00 budget (BY). Also shown in POM 98-99 is the prior year (PY) and current budget years (CY) (96-97) and the next four years (00-03). This six-year program is illustrated in Table (3) below.

POM 1998-99 covers the following years:				
PY	97			
CY	98			
BY	99			
BY+1	00			
Next 4 Years	01	02	03	04

**Table 3-1. POM 1998-99**

**(2) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).** The FYDP is the basic DoD programming tool and is updated three times per year. It is a database that records, summarizes, and displays decisions that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense through the PPBS process. The FYDP is an integrated and coordinated program document that displays forces, costs, manpower, procurement and construction in the approved programs. Costs of programs are displayed for an eight year period, while force levels are displayed for a total of eleven years. It is a tool that keeps PPBS management informed of what has been done in the past, and what is to be accomplished in the future.

**(3) Resource Allocation Display (RAD) and WINPAT.** The Resource Allocation Display (RAD) is the DON database showing the allocation of resources according to Resource Sponsor, Claimant, program element, appropriation, Naval warfare task, and line item or activity group. The content of the RAD actually overlaps the FYDP. Access to the FYDP and RAD databases is provided through the Windows Program Analysis Toolkit (WINPAT). WINPAT is an information system that is used during the PPBS cycle.

### *b. Programming Sub-phases*

There are four sub-phases within the programming phase that are necessary for POM development. They are summarized in **Table (3-2)**.

PROGRAMMING SUBPHASE	DESCRIPTION
Program Appraisal	Appraise warfare and support programs and assess the state of the Navy. Priorities are developed for programming phase
POM Development	Begins after Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) published. Initiates further program and policy guidance for DON. Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) are the major initial proposals for POM.
POM Delivery	Final months of POM development. Meetings held to review the POM and resolve the remaining program issues.
OSD Program Review	Begins with POM submission to OSD. Review focuses on differences between OSD staff and the services POM submission. Conducted by Defense Planning and Resource Board.

**Table 3-2.** Programming Sub-phases

### **3. The Budgeting Phase**

The budget cycle is the third and final stage of the PPBS and is the process of turning the POM into a budget. It focuses on the two most current years in the plan. The budgeting phase is completed when the President sends his budget to Congress each February. The budget formulation and review process involves two main steps:

- Formulation and translating program decisions and costs into proper budget format with review, modification, and approval from the Department of the Navy, and
- Justification and presentation of the budget and several rounds of review and revision until it is finally passed by Congress.

Claimants formulate the budget through a succession of inputs. The five primary appropriation categories are Research & Development, Procurement, Operation and Maintenance,

Military Personnel, and Military Construction. After claimants submit inputs, it undergoes several rounds of formal review in order for it to reflect the Navy's needs while staying within budgetary constraints of the national economy. The FYDP is then updated to reflect the decisions incorporated in the President's budget. **Table (3-3)** shows the major differences between the POM and the budget formulation.

DIFFERENCE	POM	Budget
• FOCUS	• Major DON programs	• Each DON program
• RESPONSIBILITY	• Resource Sponsors	• Budget Submitting Offices
• COST ESTIMATES	• Gross dollars	• More precise dollar figures
• DETERMINED BY	• Mission	• Appropriation
• RESULTS	• Program Decision Memorandum	• President's Budget


**Table 3-3.** Major Differences between POM and Budget Formulation

It is important to reiterate that all three cycles of PPBS are happening simultaneously and that each part of PPBS has an affect on manpower organizations. Manpower has historically been the appropriations area typically overlooked in favor of new ships, aircraft and research. However, without properly determined manpower requirements the most expensive and advanced aircraft, ships, and weapons systems would be inadequately manned.

## B. THE MANPOWER PROCESS

The terms manpower and personnel are often confused. While there is a distinct difference between them, the two terms are interrelated. In common terms, manpower deals with filling "spaces" (bils) and personnel deals with "faces" (manning). A simplified view of the manpower and personnel process is shown in **Figure (3-3)**.


The manpower process consists of three main steps: 1) determining and validating requirements, 2) authorizing requirements through funding, and 3) qualitzing bils. Once a billet is created, the personnel system is designed to ensure a trained person fills the billet on time.



**Figure 3-3.** Steps in the Manpower and Personnel Process (Operational)

The manpower system is designed to create billets, which upon being filled by trained personnel results, in a platform or activity being able to accomplish its mission. A simplified view of the manpower process is shown in **Figure (3-4)**. The process begins by determining the requirements of each Naval activity. The requirement's determination process does not address the affordability or the feasibility of achieving manning levels, only what personnel are required to perform under warfare situations.

The requirements determination and validation process is different for operational (ships, squadrons) and shore activities. For operational activities a centralized process is used with NAVMAC overseeing the manpower requirements determination process. For shore activities the process has been decentralized to twenty-two manpower claimants. Both processes will be described in some detail.



**Figure 3-4.** The Manpower Process

### 1. Determining Operational Requirements

For operational activities the manpower process begins with the identification of a Naval Activity's workload based on its "Required Operational Capability/Projected Operating Environment" (ROC/POE) statement. The ROC provides a precise definition of the unit's mission statement. The POE is a description of the specific operating environment in which the unit is expected to operate. Warfare Sponsors are the originators of the ROC/POE and are responsible for any revisions. Warfare and manpower experts determine the proper manpower mix when building this foundation document. All manpower requirements are ultimately based on the assumptions depicted in the ROC/POE.

Ship manpower requirements are derived from empirical functional workload data in the ROC. The ROC is a statement of the ship's expected mission and operational capabilities. Data provided in the POE is the primary source for determining squadron manpower requirements. Aircraft authorization, crew seat ratio, flight hours and sortie length, etc. from the POE are applied to determine this. The approximate number of work hours to meet these requirements is then determined.

Once the basic work hours are determined, Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) applies the approved Navy standard productive workweek (67 hours productive time per week) to derive the staffing required by specific skill. The manpower requirements needed to accomplish this workload then are identified in terms of quantity (the number of requirements) and quality (the paygrade plus skills required to perform that requirement).

The Ship Manning Document (SMD), Fleet Manning Document (FMD), or the Squadron Manning Document (SQMD) is developed during this process depending on the type of unit. NAVMAC uses the information in the ROC/POE, maintenance data, various staffing standards, and possibly an on-site validation to create this document for an operational activity. Following analysis by NAVMAC the document is sent to the fleet for comment and validation. The resultant validated manpower requirements represent the minimum number of manpower requirements necessary to staff the activity to fully perform its wartime mission. Wartime manpower requirements (referred to as M+1), equate to the number of personnel required to complete 100% of the work tasked to the activity. Valid wartime requirements are essential so that the fleet is manned to meet any realistic threat, as determined in the planning phase of PPBS.

## **2. Determining Shore Requirements**

The process of determining and validating requirements for shore activities is different from operational activities. The Shore Manpower Requirements Determination Process (SMRDP) provides a systematic means of determining and documenting minimum manpower necessary to accomplish an approved activity tasking.<sup>35</sup> The SMRDP is working toward the goal of

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<sup>35</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, OPNAVINST 1000.16J, January, 1998, p. 7.

standardization between similar activities and has laid the burden of responsibility on the manpower claimant.

The manpower claimant is responsible for the determination and validation of shore manpower requirements. The claimant reviews, measures, and assesses an activity's requirements against the activity's workload taking into account both wartime and peacetime workloads. The basic process of determining shore manpower requirements is as follows:

1. Manpower claimants base manpower requirements on the directed Mission, Function, Task statements (MFTs) and identify the specific workload functions that must be performed, including determining specific tasks, frequencies, and time to complete tasks;
2. Determine the minimum quantity of manpower required to support activities peacetime workload using Industrial Engineering techniques. The standard formula for requirements determination is:

$$\text{Total monthly man-hours} / \text{Navy standard work-month (145.136)} = \text{Total number of requirements};$$

3. Determine the manpower mix (military- active or reserve, civilian, or contractor);
4. Determine wartime requirements, using peacetime requirements as a baseline (standard work-month changes to 249 hours);
5. Compare results to the current Activity Manning Document (AMD) and if necessary, submit change requests.<sup>36</sup>

### **3. Validated Requirements**

Validated requirements are entered into the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS) database. TFMMS is the single authoritative source of Navy manpower data. It tracks manpower resources, requirements and authorizations. TFMMS has three overlapping components:

- The **FYDP file** reflects the quantity of budgeted End strength at an activity;

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<sup>36</sup> Manpower Fundamentals, An indoctrination Course for CNO (N12) Personnel

- The **Billet file** shows all the current requirements/authorizations at a detailed level by quantity (number) and quality (paygrade);
- The **Activity file** contains descriptive and distribution data for all activities assigned.

#### **4. Authorization of Funding**

Just because a valid M+1 requirement exists does not necessarily mean that it will be funded and become a billet. After a requirement is determined and validated, the resource sponsor determines the level of funding. The term manpower authorization describes a manpower requirement supported by approved funding, thereby marking the creation of a billet.<sup>37</sup> Authorized requirements are entered into TFMMS and the Activity Manning Document (AMD). Manpower documents, including the Ship Manpower Documents (SMD), Fleet Manpower Documents (FMD), and Squadron Manpower Documents (SQMD) are used to update the AMD. The AMD is a single source document that provides the quantitative (number) and qualitative (paygrade) manpower requirements (military, civilian, and contractor) and manpower authorizations (military) allocated to a naval activity to perform its assigned missions.<sup>38</sup> Authorized billets are identified on the AMD by a Manpower Resource Code (MRC) which indicates how the billet is to be resourced (i.e., military, civilian). Authorizations are the basis for the planning and distribution of the Navy personnel inventory. Although the manpower resource sponsors are responsible for paying for each authorized billet, the major manpower claimants (MC) and sub-manpower claimants (SMC) actually determine which of the existing billets will be funded (i.e., authorized) and which will remain unfunded. The partial listing of resource sponsors and manpower claimants is shown in **Table (3-4)**. They provide billet authorization inputs to the appropriate billet writer at NAVMAC.

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<sup>37</sup> Chief of Naval Operations, Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures, OPNAVINST 1000.16J, January, 1998, p. 7.


<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 10-2.

<u>Resource Sponsors</u>	<u>Major Claimants</u>	<u>Sub-Claimants</u>
N4 Logistics	CINCLANT	AIRLANT
N6 Staffs	CINCPAC	SUBPAC
N85 Amphibious	BUMED	SURFLANT
N86 Surface	BUPERS	SECGRUPAC
N87 Submarine	CNO	CNATRA
N88 Aviation		

Source: OPNAVINST 1000.16J

**Table 3-4.** Manpower Resource Sponsors, Claimants, and Sub-claimants (partial list)

Billets Authorized (BA) does not necessarily reflect the number of personnel at an activity. Many activities are not funded at wartime or even peacetime requirements. The Navy Manning Plan (NMP) represents the “fair share” of available assets and generally falls short of BA. Current Onboard (COB) is the number of personnel that are actually in place on a given day, which is generally less than NMP. **Figure (3-5)** illustrates this relationship between manpower and manning and the readiness gap that develops between the number onboard an activity and the M+1 requirements.



**Figure 3-5.** Manpower versus Manning

Once a billet is created, the responsibility falls on the personnel system to ensure that the billet is filled with a properly trained individual. Officer and Enlisted Program Authority (OPA/EPA) are documents providing end strength guidance for the Navy. End strength refers to the Congressionally mandated number that the Navy must be at (plus or minus one percent) at the end of each fiscal year. N12 provides this year-end personnel target to strength planners and community managers. The OPA and EPA are the “demand signal” that the manpower system delivers to the personnel system to meet Navy manning requirements as constrained by the budget.

## C. THE PERSONNEL PROCESS

The personnel system consists of two major functional areas; Community Management and Distribution. The manpower process up to this point is nearly identical for officers and enlisted, however the personnel process varies substantially. This variation is due in large part to the size of the respective communities. A description of each stage in the process follows.

### 1. Community Management

The details of Community Management are discussed in the next chapter, as this is a primary focus of this thesis, however, the major functions are described here. The primary purpose of community management is to ensure that the right people, with the right training, are available to the distribution people in order to man the fleet. They accomplish this in a macro sense through end strength planning and at a micro level through the officer and enlisted community managers.

**End strength planning** involves predicting and managing the Navy's total gains and losses for a given fiscal year in order to meet OPA/EPA end strength targets. To do this, strength-planners plan the number of recruits and promotions needed to offset the expected losses from retirements and separations.

**The Community Managers** take end strength planning one step further. The Community Managers' primary responsibility is to shape and sustain each officer and enlisted community in order to meet the Navy's needs. Skill levels must be monitored and plans and policies formulated in order to shape a community.

### 2. Distribution

Distribution is the process whereby personnel managers match vacancies in field activities to individuals. It includes three distinct processes; allocation, placement, and assignment. **Allocation** is the process whereby personnel expected to be available within a specified period of time are projected for assignment into Manning Control Authorities (MCA) and also to sea or shore duty. MCAs are responsible for manning specific geographic regions. The MCAs are BUPERS, CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT and COMNAVRESFOR. **Placement** is considered the primary advocate of the activity that has the vacant billet. Placement is the process that deals with ensuring

that the individual assigned to the vacant billet has the proper qualifications and training, and arrives at the right time. **Assignment** is primarily concerned with job matching – matching the individual to the job. While efforts are made to satisfy the career and personal needs of the individual, the needs of the Navy often become an overriding factor in the assignment process. Detailers, as assignment officers are commonly known, are considered the sailors' advocate in the distribution process. While there are similarities between the officer and enlisted distribution systems, there are enough differences to warrant discussing each one separately.

*a. Officer Distribution*

The basis for officer allocation is the Officer Distributable Projections (ODPROJ) computer program. ODPROJ provides an “on demand” projection of officer strength by designator and grade, available for distribution twelve months into the future. The output of this ODPROJ in conjunction with billet information from TFFMS is used to develop the Navy Manning Plan – Officers (NMPO), which sets the manning level for activities. This document is used by officer placement to fairly distribute available personnel to the fleet. NMP-O will specify at what level various activities will be manned. For instance, submarines are typically manned at 100% of BA while BUPERS may only be manned at 90%. Officer placement personnel first review vacancy listings created by projected officer losses and NMPO guidance. They then work with the activity experiencing the vacancy concerning specific qualifications and training required for the billet. Upon completion of this process the placement officer will “post” the vacancy to the detailer.

The detailer provides the individual linkage in the process by dealing one-on-one with the individual. The detailer must consider numerous issues when making the assignment decision. Individual factors such as duty preference, grade, job qualifications, specialized training and continued career progression are taken into account. Administrative items such as the available and required enroute training and transfer cost must also be factored into the detailer’s decision. Once the detailer and individual officer verbally agree on a job assignment, eligibility criteria are met, and no other waivers are required, the detailer will issue an assignment directive, or “orders,” for transfer. The detailer coordinates with the placement officer to ensure detachment and reporting

dates are acceptable to both the gaining and losing commands. The detailer then forwards the orders to placement for actual release.

*b. Enlisted Distribution*

The enlisted distribution process is more automated than the officer process due in large part to the tremendous difference in size between the communities. A key element in the enlisted allocation process is the Enlisted Distributable Projections (EDPROJ), which provides a monthly projection of personnel strength by community, available for distribution 9 months into the future. Its output, along with the billet information from TFMMS, is used for the development of the Navy Manning Plan (NMP). Enlisted and officer allocation differ in that NMP is the primary tool used by the MCAs to reflect the manning priorities assigned. The MCAs are tasked to assist the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in managing requirements for priority manning. The MCAs also establish detailing priorities necessary to maintain readiness and then assign priorities to billet vacancies.

The Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) functions similar to officer placement in that it is concerned with activity manning. EPMAC works closely with the MCAs to determine the assignment priority and generate requisitions for the activity. EPMAC maintains the Enlisted Personnel Requisition System (EPRES) which is used to provide the NMP with the projected inventory available for distribution and the detailers with a prioritized listing of vacancies by community and paygrade. The detailer uses this information in one-on-one negotiations with the individual. Once the individual and detailer agree on a job assignment, the orders are processed to fill the vacancy in the fleet.


## **D. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL ORGANIZATIONS**

A functional knowledge of the manpower and personnel organizational structure is important in order to develop a basic understanding of the system and its many interrelationships. A description follows of the overall command structure and of each individual organization in approximate order of where it fits into the manpower and personnel process.


## **1. The Command Structure**

The manpower and personnel system command structure has undergone substantial recent changes, resulting mainly from the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decision to move BUPERS from its longstanding location in Washington D.C. to Millington, Tennessee.

The intent of the BRAC decision was for the entire BUPERS organization to relocate as a cost-saving initiative. However, as the date for the move approached, it was clear that the entire organization would not be able to leave Washington due to the complex web of interrelationships that many manpower managers have with other area organizations. The initial plan was to leave only a few manpower personnel behind, but this number quickly escalated into the hundreds. This group consists primarily of N10, N12 and N13- organizations requiring complex interrelationships to accomplish their work. The Washington-based manpower organization falls under the OPNAV organizational structure shown in **Figure (3-6)**. This move resulted in the disestablishment of BUPERS in September of 1998 and the establishment of the Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM) in Millington. The NAVPERSCOM organizational structure still is evolving but the current configuration is shown in **Figure (3-7)**. N1 is dual-hatted as Chief of Naval Personnel and will remain primarily in Washington, D.C.



**Figure 3-6.** OPNAV Organizational Structure



**Figure 3-7.** CNP and Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSCOM) Organizational Structure

## **2. Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC)**

NAVMAC is located in Millington, TN and reports to N12 and also to COMNAVPERSCOM. NAVMAC's primary responsibility is to determine and validate fleet manpower requirements. They assist Warfare Sponsors in the development of the ROC/POE statements, and develop and manage the SQMD, SMD, and FMD. NAVMAC assists and processes all changes to the AMD and is also responsible for managing TFMMS. They provide OPNAV support in developing policies and procedures for manpower requirements programs. **Table (3-5)** summarizes the main functions and responsibilities of NAVMAC.

NAVMAC FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
• Determine and validate fleet manpower requirements
• Computes wartime (M+1) requirements
• Assist Warfare Sponsors in development of ROC/POE statements
• Develop and manage SMD, FMD, SQMD
• TFMMS management
• Assist in development of AMD and process all change requests
• Provide OPNAV support in developing policy and procedures for manpower management
• Perform on-site assessments for fleet and shore activities

**Table 3-5.** NAVMAC Functions and Responsibilities

## **3. Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC)**

EPMAC was established in 1975 because Fleet Commanders in Chiefs (FLTCINCS) wanted an agent to ensure compliance with their manning policies and to maintain personnel readiness within those policies. EPMAC's mission is to provide centralized management support for the distribution of active duty enlisted personnel in accordance with the overall management policies of the MCAs. In a nutshell, EPMAC is responsible for the enlisted readiness of the fleet. This is accomplished through the promulgation, evaluation, and revision of the Navy Manning Plan

(NMP), by identifying personnel vacancies through EPRES, and by managing the Readiness Information System (RIS).<sup>39</sup>

#### **4. Total Force Programming, Manpower and Information Resources Management Division (N12)**

In 1995, former CNO, Admiral Jeremy Boorda established N12 as a single point of contact to resolve manpower issues.<sup>40</sup> N12 exists to oversee effective and efficient management of the Navy's manpower resources and requirements., and N12, as the single manpower sponsor, it ensures the proper number of personnel are requested in the POM process and budget preparation to meet specific levels of readiness. N12 is also responsible for ensuring funding is available to support the required manpower. They are also charged with making sure that the required funding to support the needed manpower is available. They work closely with Resource Sponsors (N8) to ensure that manpower and its funding does not drop below specified levels of readiness. The missions and responsibilities of N12 are summarized in **Table (3-6)**.

N12 MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide an effective and independent appraisal capability to review program performance in relation to approved plans and objectives</li><li>• Act as the single manpower sponsor with responsibility and accountability for manpower actions</li><li>• Act as the Navy-wide program sponsor and resource sponsor for M&amp;P information systems</li><li>• Provide liaison and guidance for achieving Navy-wide as well as joint information sharing</li><li>• Streamline initiatives for manpower requirements and determination</li><li>• Become the central driver for M&amp;P technology</li><li>• Act as an honest broker for all manpower issues through development of independent analytical capability</li></ul>

**Table 3-6.** N12 Missions and Responsibilities

<sup>39</sup> Information derived from briefing material on EPMAC (August, 1998).

<sup>40</sup> Manpower Fundamentals, An Indoctrination Course for CNO (12) Personnel

## **5. Distribution Department (Pers-4)**

The Distribution department recently moved from the Navy Annex in Washington D.C. to become part of the new COMNAVPERSCOM structure in Millington, TN. Pers-4 is responsible for the final step in the manpower and personnel process where assignments are coordinated between activities and individuals. It is the department that implements many of the policies affecting Navy personnel. Pers-4 main functions are as follows:

- Implement the policies of the Community Managers (N13), i.e., officer and enlisted assignments, placement, retention, career enhancement and motivation, and career progression.
- Coordinate the development of fleet and shore personnel requisitions to ensure the most efficient utilization of active duty personnel in support of the Navy billet structure.

## **6. Center for Naval Education and Training (CNET)**

The Center for Naval Education and Training (CNET), located in Pensacola, Florida, is responsible for the training and education programs of Navy personnel. They coordinate with the fleet, N13, and CNRC to ensure the proper number of personnel are trained to meet fleet requirements. CNET does not work for the CNP, but close coordination between the organizations is required.

## **7. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC)**

CNRC, relocating to Millington, Tennessee under the new command structure, is responsible for civilian recruiting and basic military training. They control the number of new accessions entering the Navy, and rely on estimates provided by N13 strength planners.

## **8. Other Manpower Resources Centers**

### *a. Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Center (NPRST)*

The Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Center (formerly the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center) is in the process of relocating from San Diego, California to Millington, Tennessee to become part of the COMNAVPERSCOM structure. NPRST conducts research in manpower, personnel and training issues for the Navy and Marine Corps. They report to the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and are primarily charged with manpower and personnel research. An important resource for manpower and personnel planners, NPRST research has resulted in improvements in recruiting, selection and classification, training, and management of personnel.<sup>41</sup>

### *b. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)*

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is a federally funded research center that provides analysis on a variety of Naval problems and issues. Although CNA does not report to CNP; it is still an available resource for manpower and personnel organizations.

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<sup>41</sup> Information from NPRST web page

## **IV. THE N13 ORGANIZATION**

The N13 organization epitomizes the “heartbeat” of the Navy manpower and personnel system. If not the “heartbeat”, then it is certainly a key linkage in a very complex system. It is the critical link connecting manpower requirements with personnel distribution. This chapter provides a snapshot of the current N13 organization. N13 is described in some detail, particularly in terms of its background, mission, leadership, structure, tasks, and information and human resources systems.

The methodology for conducting an organizational analysis of N13 included literature and archival data review combined with semi-structured interviews and formal questionnaires. Excerpts from sixteen interviews and seven ECM questionnaires are interspersed throughout the chapter to enhance understanding of this complex organization based on the perceptions of leaders, managers, and key personnel. Respondents’ names are omitted to preserve anonymity.

### **A. BACKGROUND**

Until recently, the Navy Annex was the home to the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS), where the majority of manpower and personnel organizations are in close proximity to each other and to other Navy and DoD organizations located on Capitol Hill. N13 is located in the eighth wing of the Navy’s Arlington Annex, one floor below N12. Its location, just a short walk from the Pentagon, is geographically suited for the political discussions involved in arranging the Navy’s manpower and personnel needs. It is not a modern structure, and has served as the headquarters for the Navy’s manpower and personnel organization since World War II. From the street, these three and four-story buildings, surrounded by a high chain-link fence, look more like a Federal penitentiary than a government office building. As one N13 person stated, “There aren’t any sculptures in our driveway.”

The view from inside the building is also stark. Private “walled” offices are reserved only for the select few, mostly Captains and Admirals. Less fortunate Captains and most other personnel are assigned to a “pooka,” with portable walls dividing large rooms into multiple office spaces. This

arrangements tends to leave visitors in a rather confused and unwelcome state as they roam tiled passageways looking for indistinguishable offices in long rows of nearly identical buildings.

The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) decision to move BUPERS to Millington, Tennessee has impacted the structure and processes of the manpower and personnel system.<sup>42</sup> Many evidently do not concur with the “politics” involved in the decision and are anticipating major problems. The Deputy Director (N13B) stated:

“I don’t know the logic behind why they wanted to move BUPERS down there in the first place, but I think it’s going to be very challenging to provide the same level of service both to the member and to the Navy, and I think a lot of the communities are realizing that.”

Only those BUPERS personnel that were considered “unmovable” due to the close working relationships with others in the Washington area, are remaining behind under the OPNAV structure (see **Figure 10**). All others relocated in support of the BRAC decision. This move not only split the entire manpower and personnel organization, but also resulted in a restructuring of N13 itself. The Promotion Boards section of N13 (formerly Pers-2C) moved to Millington and has been realigned under NAVPERSCOM. The restructuring was described as follows:

We’re in a little bit of a transition now in a couple ways. One, the move of BUPERS to Memphis has caused some reorganization in the folks that were left behind. For example, Pers-2 used to control the selection board process from cradle to grave from a policy standpoint. Well, we took the Pers-2C people and did that and moved them into N8 so that they could physically be collocated with the Pers-3 folks who actually run the logistics of the selection board process, because the two were so closely entwined. Once the board is close to getting started, they have to be able to walk from office to office quickly with paper; it’s not electronically feasible to run the paper back and forth between Washington and Millington. So, that was one of the reorganizations that got forced upon us.

Not only has the entire manpower and personnel organization been reorganized it has also been substantially downsized. The military drawdown, which began before the Gulf War and is now appearing to stabilize, has affected almost every military activity. Since 1990, Navy Active Duty

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<sup>42</sup> The 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act authorized base closures in 1991, 1993, and 1995.

end strength has been reduced by 36 percent.<sup>43</sup> BUPERS has taken a cut across the entire organization. Although the number of sailors in the Navy to be managed has been reduced, the number of functions to be managed has remained essentially the same. As the Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch stated:

I mean what's the difference between managing 55,000 officers or 70,000 officers. The same requirements are there. It hasn't changed.

## B. N13 MISSION

Prior to looking at the N13 mission, it is helpful to first look at the mission of the parent organization, BUPERS. According to N13B, there are three universes in the Navy; people, operations, and procurement, with BUPERS controlling the "people" universe and N13 at the center of it. According to N1B,

The overall purpose of BUPERS is to balance the needs of the Navy and the needs of the individual so that we get the right people in the right job in the right place with the right training at the right time. It's really a balance of getting the right people- we've got to recruit, push them through a training system and balance the needs of the individual going through that- to the needs of the Navy...and to do that at the right cost...and we really don't have all the money in the world to do that...You've got to balance all three of these.

The N13 Command brief describes N13's mission as consisting of three major responsibilities; 1) develop and implement personnel plans and policy, 2) monitor adherence to attain fiscal and End strength objectives, and 3) plan and direct career progression for officer and enlisted personnel. The following are the informal mission statements given by N13 personnel.

The overall purpose of N13 would be to find and assess the best possible recruits, officer or enlisted, to ensure they are given the proper tools in order to do their jobs, to care for them as they go through their careers in terms of compensation and benefits and career management and to help them as they leave the Navy. That's from the sense of serving the customer or the member. Then we have a symmetrical mission of doing those same things for the Navy. We assess people for the Navy by ensuring the right and qualified people are sent to the proper places, that the communities are managed and that the force is structured possible.

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<sup>43</sup> Office of Budget Department of the Navy, "FY 1999 Department of the Navy Budget," Sept. 1997.

That is basically a corollary to what you are doing for the folks turns around to be a benefit for the Navy.

The overall purpose of N13 is to manage the Navy's officer and enlisted inventory and to set policies relating to that inventory. So, whether it's compensation, advancement, promotion, recruiting or high year tenure policy, all those various policies relate to how you manage the force. N13 is responsible for managing the force in its entirety...the entire officer and enlisted forces and is also responsible for managing the individual skills within that.

These informal mission statements describe what the organizational members feel is the primary mission of the organization. The Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) faces the challenge of meeting the needs of the Navy and individual sailors in an austere financial environment. The above mission statements summarize the complexity of N13 and alludes to its critical role as the "heartbeat" of a larger organism, providing the right mix of personnel to meet defense and Naval requirements.

### **C. SENIOR EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP**

The executive leadership, comprised of the Admiral (N13) and his deputy (N13B) spends a large portion of its time dealing with other manpower and personnel organizations. A significant effort is required to coordinate, seek consensus, and promulgate policies and plans among the various stakeholders.

Branch heads are given a great deal of autonomy in dealing with their area of responsibilities, however, policy decisions go through the Admiral. Anecdotal evidence indicates that past leadership may attempt to micromanage initially, but soon recognize limits regarding span-of-control. As with all military leadership, ultimate responsibility resides with the senior person in the organization.

**The Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13)** is traditionally a two-star billet. There is no standard career path for this job. The current Admiral followed a fairly typical career path for an Unrestricted Line Officer spending most of his time in operational billets. During shore tours he gained some knowledge into the manpower and personnel world. Upon

selection to Admiral, he served a short tour as N12 until he assumed the duties of N13. The two top positions, N12 and N13, have somewhat of a sequential relationship as evidenced by the following:

The N12 guy is under a lot of heat from N8 (the Resource Sponsor) to get everything in a box- get the money the way it should be...They can break things and it will never impact them (in N12). But, if you know that you're coming down here (N13) to receive those dollars that you programmed for a couple years previously- it makes you more interested in doing it correctly. *Those two jobs together (N12 and N13) make or break Navy personnel. If they (N12) don't come up with the right money, it's very hard for us (N13) to implement anything down here.*

Unfortunately, the job assignment of Admirals often is based more on politics than practicalities, so this is not a consistent practice.

In contrast to the somewhat manpower experienced Director, the **Deputy (N13B)** is an aviator (helicopter pilot) with no previous manpower experience. He was ordered in as the Compensation Chief and then as he describes:

I spent about 6 months upstairs as Compensation Chief (N130), and then through the vagaries of retirement, and them not finding who they wanted or needed, I ended up rolling down here.

It is interesting to note that learning the N13 business was not the most difficult challenge for the Deputy Director, it was learning how things work in Washington, D.C. As he observed:

Actually the lack of Washington experience probably hurt me more than the lack of personnel experience...Most of what you're talking about is managing your resources, managing your people- trying to take care of your folks while also trying to meet the Navy's needs... So, in a sense the actual Pers-2 (N13) stuff isn't bad. Once you get the buzzwords and find out the history, it's not that hard. Now, probably the biggest weakness is the lack of Washington experience. I don't necessarily know who to go to for what. So, that's where I spend most of my time catching up.


The executive leadership spends a great deal of time interfacing with the various manpower stakeholders. The Admiral and his Deputy have neither the background knowledge nor the time to be familiar with all aspects of their organization. They must rely on their experts to educate them on issues they may not be familiar with. According to the Deputy Director:

Really, with the kind of people working for us here – it's kind of like on-time training when an issue comes up, rather than go to some course that tries to guess what we might be facing. This way when an issue comes up that I'm not familiar with I can go find the expert and get the 15 minute course when I need it to answer a specific question.


The executive staff also has several yeoman assigned to take care of the administrative requirements of the Admiral and his Deputy. In addition, the Admiral is assigned a Flag Lieutenant whose primary purpose is to coordinate the Admiral's daily schedule.

#### D. N13 STRUCTURE AND TASKS

N13 is a small organization of approximately 130 personnel that must interact with a number of external agencies to accomplish its mission. A current organizational chart was unattainable, however, the BUPERS phonebook adequately depicts the command structure. The major stakeholders are CNP, CNET, CNRC, N12 (Requirements), N10 (Budget), PERS-4 (Distribution), and N8 (Resource Sponsors) as depicted in **Figure (4-1)**. The organizational structure of N13 is shown in **Figure (4-2)**.



**Figure 4-1.** N13 Stakeholders




**Figure 4-2. N13 Organizational Structure**

### 1. Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch (N130)

This branch of the organization is located upstairs, away from the main activities. Their area of responsibility concerns compensation issues, particularly basic pay and housing allowances, subsistence allowance, and enlisted special pays; i.e., Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and Enlistment Bonus (EB). They also have policy coordination responsibilities over medical special pay. This branch is responsible for many policies and programs seemingly inconsistent with the primary purpose of N13, as indicated by the following:

We're kind of the red-headed stepchildren. We don't really fit anywhere else, but the compensation and policy coordination certainly has an effect on the ability to maintain those communities. We do a lot of interaction with the Enlisted Community Managers for who gets SRB and at what level, so there is a lot of interaction with them.

The Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch consists of 12 officer, 4 enlisted, and 2 civilian personnel. The basic structure of this division is shown in **Figure (4-3)**. The Pay and Allowances section is responsible for the numerous special pays that are not community specific. This includes Basic Pay, Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), Special and Incentive Pays, and Involuntary Separation pay. In addition, this section is also responsible for developing leave and liberty policy. The Bonus Programs section is responsible for the Enlistment Bonus (EB), Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), and Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP). The Travel and Transportation Section oversees the Overseas Housing Allowance, Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), Temporary Lodging Allowance (TLA), Dislocation Allowance and all other travel related pay. The Retired/Reserve section is responsible for retired and reserve pay policy, the voluntary separation programs (TERA, VSI, SSB), adoption reimbursement, former spouse compensation, and transitional compensation for abused dependents. The Medical Programs officer is responsible for medical department special pays and HIV assignment policy.



**Figure 4-3.** N130, Compensation and Policy Coordination Branch Organizational Structure

While some of these functions seem to be an obvious match for this branch, others follow no logical explanation. For example, the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) appears to be a misfit in this organization, as indicated by the following.

I don't see why that is part of our core mission. Maybe it would be better served in Pers-4 (Distribution), but its not really part of their core either...That policy coordination hat is where you put everything you don't know what else to do with it. The core of what we do is compensation oriented and then we do have these little policy niches that I think ended up here because no one knew where else to put them. I wasn't here when those decisions were made, so there may have been some logic behind it at the time, but I think you'd be hard-pressed now to figure out the logic.

Each person is expected to be an expert in his or her particular area, and this type of work requires extensive stakeholder interaction. Each section has its own specific network of agencies where coordination and agreement are continually sought. The Bonus Programs people do a lot of

interaction with Pers-3. The travel entitlements, housing allowance and base pay people work closely with the Defense Financial Accounting System (DFAS), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and with the Per Diem committee—a branch of OSD. The pay and compensation policies of this branch are greatly affected by federal law, and by inter-service politics and competition. For example, the basic policy around sea pay is written into law in terms of the sea pay table. If they want to change the rate for sea pay, they must go to Congress and get the law changed, which may take several years. Inter-service competition also impacts this branch, because pay and entitlements are joint issues. All the services must reach a level of agreement on DoD policy changes. For example, if the Navy wants to change the sea pay tables:

Well, even though the Air Force doesn't pay a single soul sea pay, they look at that and say, "We don't think you ought to—" because it might affect their recruiting. It might affect their ability to retain people.

This is an area where inter-service coordination and stakeholder interests are critical. Coordination is essential to ensure that all stakeholder' views are considered in policy decisions. Policy analysis is important to ensure that the policy has the desired affect while minimizing unintended consequences. Problems in the past have resulted when community managers fail to coordinate with the Compensation and Policy Coordination branch. A lot of officer pays like ACP (Aircrew Pay), ACIP (Aircrew Incentive Pay), and NOIP (Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay) are managed by the community managers, but N130 still has a policy coordination function over them. The level of policy oversight is dependent on the current management. Presently, this branch is taking an active role in coordinating the various pay policies used by the community managers. The following quotes illustrate the need for coordination among the special pay programs:


You can call it a sanity check on what they're doing. We want to make sure that something one group is doing with their special pays doesn't negatively impact on somebody else. So if we're changing ACIP maybe we should look at how it affects the relative balance between the aviators and the SWOs.

If they (Aviation OCM) are going to talk about changing ACIP, if they (Surface OCM) are going to talk about sea pay, if they (Submarine OCM) want to talk about changing the NOIP rate- all those things need to come through us, so that we can look at their impact on other pays. When we go down to the hill we can talk intelligently about why we want to do this or why we don't want to do it.

Besides making policy decisions, much time is spent responding to questions and daily tasking. Answering the phone / e-mail and responding to congressional inquiries fills most of the hours in a day.

## 2. Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch (N132)

The Enlisted Plans and Policy branch is the largest of the four branches and is composed of approximately 22 officers, 33 enlisted, and 3 civilians, with several personnel dual-hatted in other branches. There are three sections under control of the Director, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch: Enlisted Plans and Advancement, Training Coordination, and Enlisted Career Development. The organizational structure of this branch is shown in **Figure (4-4)**. The branch is headed by a Captain and his Deputy, who is dual-hatted as N132 (Head ECM). They are responsible for providing oversight and coordination between the three sections.



**Figure 4-4.** N132, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch Organizational Structure

*a. Enlisted Plans and Advancement Section (N132C)*

The Enlisted Plans and Advancement section is composed of five personnel responsible for strength and advancement planning to meet the requirements in the Enlisted Programming Authorization (EPA).

**(1) Strength Planning.** Strength planning is central to the N13 process. The strength planner's goal is to predict and manage the Navy's total enlisted gains and losses for a given fiscal year so that at the end of the fiscal year the congressionally mandated End strength number is reached. The key formula used by strength planners is:

$$\text{End Strength} = \text{Begin Strength} + \text{Gains} - \text{Losses}$$

The End Strength (number of enlisted in the Navy at the end of the year) equals the Begin Strength (number of enlisted at the beginning of the year) plus the "gains" (number of sailors produced by Recruiting Command), minus the "losses" (number of sailors lost to attrition, retirement, etc).

The strength planners receive guidance from N12 in the form of the EPA, which gives the desired force in terms of quantity and quality (paygrade). With this working document as a base, strength planners use historic trends and build a plan using SPAN (Strength Planning Analysis Model). A Strength Planner describes the process:


I'll get where I'm going to start that year and I look at my model to tell me how many losses we're projecting. Retirements, attrition, EAOS (End of Obligated Service) losses are all projected by models and the missing number is the gains, and basically most of those are predicted by CNRC. I'm trying to hit a very large number.

Up to this point the process is fairly straightforward, however, the process now becomes more complex. If the number of losses is deemed insufficient, then incentive programs (VSI/SSB) are authorized to entice people to leave and/or SRB levels are lowered. On the other hand, if the losses are too great, SRB levels are adjusted in order to encourage higher retention. This "shaping" process is a mechanism used to balance the force structure.

The strength plan is then shown to CNET and CNRC for their inputs and comments before submitting it to the Admiral (N13) for approval. The coordination requirements

do not stop with CNRC and CNET. While there is no formalized chain of command, there is a tremendous amount of lateral coordination that is required for success. It is often these loose and informal relationships that have a direct bearing on the successful coordination efforts. The Strength Planners network is shown in **Figure (4-5)**. The key people dealt with are N12, Resource Sponsors (N8), CNRC, CNET, NTC Great Lakes, and N10 (Budget), N130 (Compensation), and the ECMs. As the Strength Planner summarized:

I'm kind of the lightning rod for issues. The interaction is always a two-way street.




**Figure 4-5.** Strength Planner Informal relationships

The Strength Planner is engaged in all three components of the PPBS. They do the preplanning for the POM, work with the Programmers to ensure enough money will be available in the out-years, and work with the Budgeters (N10) for current year execution. The strength of these relationships often appears dependent on the individuals occupying the various positions as evidenced by the following:

I currently enjoy a good working relationship with all these arms and it wasn't like that when I first got here- and that's the key. I would say that there are five O-5s that keep everything running smoothly and when I first got here we didn't always talk and that was kind of scary.

**(2) The Strength Planning Process.** The Strength Planner deals with implementing policy. The planning process is centered on the budget cycle and is complex due to the interrelationships required to accomplish the job. **Figure (4-6)** illustrates the entire strength planning process.



**Figure 4-6.** Strength planning process

N12 provides the EPA and end strength control memos to the enlisted strength planner (N13), who then gives a revised EPA to the ECMs who check the plan and provide accession and promotion requirements for each community. The strength planner then submits a budget to N10 who combines this with the officer and non-strength related budget to build the actual budget submit. This budget submission goes to the Navy Comptrollers, who analyze it for fiscal compliance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) receive the Navy submission and analyze it. It is then combined with the other service submissions when sending the President's Budget to Congress. Once Congress approves the budget it becomes an approved Defense Authorization Act.

After the plan is approved, N10 (Budget) monitors the execution of the plan on a monthly basis. The goal is to fine-tune the plan throughout the year so that on September 30<sup>th</sup> the end strength number is reached (plus or minus one percent).<sup>44</sup>

**(3) Advancement Planning.** Advancement planning is the process of establishing the number of enlisted personnel to be advanced to paygrades E-4 to E-9 for all ratings. The goal of the advancement planner is to maintain the inventory of enlisted in each paygrade while not exceeding end strength or budget constraints.

The advancement planning process is the combined effort of the strength planner, advancement planner, and community managers. The strength planner provides the advancement planner with All Navy (ALNAV) end strength and advancement targets. The advancement planner coordinates the development of three separate plans; E-4 through E-6, E-7, and E-8 through E-9. For each advancement plan, projection of inventory losses, computation of vacancies, and the computation of advancements constrained by advancement resources is required.<sup>45</sup>

**b. Training Coordination (N132E)**

The Training Coordination section is responsible for developing overall “A” and “C” School plans. One person is assigned sole responsibility for each plan with oversight provided by the section head.

**(1) “A” School Planner.** “A” School training provides initial rate training to enlisted personnel entering a rating. The “A” school plan is developed by the Training Section (N131E) who works closely with the ECMs, CNRC, and CNET.

The basic input to the “A” School plan is a five year forecast of “A” School input requirements. These forecasts must ensure that there are sufficient inputs to the inventory of trained personnel to satisfy the EPA requirements. “A” School planners are constrained by budget, school capacity, and instructor/student ratios.

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<sup>44</sup> Information derived from interviews and briefing material on Strength Planning.

<sup>45</sup> Navy Personnel, Research and Development Center, *ECM Tutorial*, November 1994, pp. 77-83.

Release of the EPA drives the “A” School plan. The ECM develops a plan based on the EPA for their communities. The “A” School planner consolidates the ECM inputs as well as other inputs to develop an unconstrained training plan. This plan is then sent to CNET, where it is constrained by classroom size, number of instructors, or facility limitations. The “A” School planner then has the ECMs validate the constrained plan. The approved plan is then loaded into the Navy Integrated Training Resource and Administration System (NITRAS), and changed or modified as necessary throughout the execution year.<sup>46</sup>

(2) **“C” School Planner.** The “C” School planner is responsible for developing and implementing the annual plan. “C” Schools are required when training is required for a particular billet or job. Training requirements for “C” Schools are based on force structure billets, inventory of personnel holding an Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code, projected gains and losses for each NEC skill, and training for new systems and equipment. NECs are used to code billets and enlisted personnel. The “C” School plan determines for a given year and the next four years, the number of personnel that must be graduated from a “C” School granting a particular NEC in order to meet the number of billets requiring that NEC.

The process begins with the development of an unconstrained plan. The “C” School planner develops the plan in conferences attended by ECMs, detailers, training commands, and resource sponsors. The training commands (CNET, AIRLANT, AIRPAC, BUMED, etc.) then analyze the plan and put their particular constraints on it. ECMs and Resource Sponsors then review the constrained plan before the “C” School planner implements the final plan.<sup>47</sup>

### *c. Enlisted Career Development (N132D)*

Community managers are the focal point for all actions that affect a community: accessions, training, advancements, sea/shore rotation, retention and bonuses, career path development, and separation/retirement. The ECMs are responsible for the “cradle-to-grave” management of their communities. The Enlisted Career Development section makes up the majority

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp. 17-29.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp. 44-64.

of N13 with 16 officers and 25 Technical Advisors (Tech Ads) managing all the enlisted communities. The Head ECM is responsible for overseeing the work of all the ECMS. Dual hatted as the Deputy of Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch, he is extremely busy. He relies on each ECM to manage their communities and bring up any major issues as they arise.

Each officer and assistant is responsible for several related communities. The ECM and Tech Ads are both senior representatives from their communities who need to work closely together. For example, a post Department Head aviator and a senior enlisted are responsible for managing a group of aviation ratings. This ensures that the community managers have a good understanding of the communities being managed. As noted by one ECM:

I care about these troops that call me on the phone. A GS-13 won't...Every time a kid calls me with a big career decision I feel good.

The fundamental ECM tasks are not difficult to learn. The estimated time it takes to become comfortable with this job ranged from three to six months depending on prior experience. As one ECM stated (and subsequently echoed by others):

ECM work is not rocket science and is easily picked up from Tech Ads that work for me and by just asking questions. Ninety percent of it is just common sense.

The ECMS are not only concerned with meeting current manpower requirements, but also with shaping the community inventory to meet future requirements. The community managers monitor their inventory and formulate plans and policies to achieve desired goals. The ECMS require extensive coordination to accomplish multiple missions. They must coordinate with the N13 strength planner, CNRC (via the strength planner), CNET (via the training coordinators), and with the detailers. This coordination is a crucial linkage because ECMS are developing the plans and policies executed by the detailers. The detailer's recent move to Millington will present significant challenges to this coordination.

...Now it's almost daily contact. Soon (after the move) it's going to be e-mail and telephone...It's a lot easier to deal with someone when you can put a face to a voice. If you're just an e-mail address then it almost makes it impersonal. Yeah, it's going to be a problem. It's going to be a change and everyone is resistant to change.

The organizational split has already caused a change in the way business is done. Paperwork routing has become a problem. Personnel requests previously hand-carried from office to office in the Navy Annex, must now be electronically routed outside the command. In many cases, additional documentation required for informed decision making, previously included in the routed package, cannot be included in the electronic routing.<sup>48</sup>

“A” and “C” School planning is important to the ECM. As the caretaker of the ratings, the ECM is responsible for ensuring that the ratings receive the number of trained personnel required to meet the EPA. ECM involvement consists of three main tasks:<sup>49</sup>

- Developing the annual training plans
- Changing existing plans to meet emergent issues
- Monitoring execution of the current plan

There are specific requirements for “A” and “C” School planning, however, there are individual differences in how planning actually occurs. Some use the models, while others basically use the past year to guide their planning. One ECM described the basic process as he viewed it.

Past experience, current NEC inventory, and projected requirements are all entering arguments in the “C” school planning process...basically boils down to training 33% of billet file. Planning for “A” school is relatively straightforward using the Skipper model.

As observed by an N7 member privy to school planning meetings:

Some communities are very precise. They know how many to send and they’re honest...Other communities- if you’ve ever been to one of these meetings you’d be stunned- will say, “I don’t know- 100, sounds good.” They’re not precise. Some communities knowing that we can never send as many as we ask for and will intentionally inflate their quotas. So you can see that this is not an exact science.

Advancement planning is another periodic task required of ECMS. They work with the advancement planner to develop a plan to meet the advancement requirements of their community. As with school planning, how the advancement planning is accomplished is left up to the individual ECM.

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<sup>48</sup> From interview with Deputy Director, N13B

<sup>49</sup> Navy Personnel, Research and Development Center, *ECM Tutorial*, November 1994. pp. 17, 44, 77.


The ECMs are responsible for much more than just training and advancement planning. This takes up only a small part of their time. Much time is spent preparing for briefs, answering questions, and dealing with the day-to-day issues that affect the community. As one ECM observed:

Routine processing of requests, ad hoc/member meeting attendance, phone calls, responding to taskers and correspondence accounts for approximately 120% of available time. The vast majority of remaining time is for planning, programming, policy review/validation, attention to community "idiosyncrasy" issues, competing for resources (quotas, funding, etc.), etc...*If an ECM is doing everything necessary and possible to support their communities (ratings, NECs, special duty communities) - they should never be caught up.*

### **3. Officer Plans and Policy Branch (N131)**

This branch is correspondingly smaller, composed of 30 mid-grade to senior officers (many are assigned as Additional Duty (ADDU)), and one civilian secretary. The organizational chart is shown in **Figure (4-7)**.

Although co-located in the same room, there is minimal interaction between the Officer and Enlisted Plans and Policy branches. While both officers and enlisted personnel must be recruited, trained, detailed, promoted, retained, and retired, different methods and tools have been designed for each. The branches are similar in structure with many of the same functions being performed (i.e., accession, training, advancement, etc.). The two branches are also inherently different, in large part due to the tremendous difference in size between the communities and the population from which they are recruited. The following is a basic description of the three sections in this branch.



**Figure 4-7.** N131, Officer Plans and Policy Branch

*a. Officer Plans and Promotion (N131C)*

(1) **Strength Planning.** As with the enlisted process, N12 provides end strength requirements to N13 in the form of the Officer Programmed Authorizations (OPA) to the officer strength planner. The strength planner then provides guidance to the individual community managers who institute plans and policies to achieve this number. Like the enlisted strength planner, historical activity (i.e., attrition, retention statistics) provides the basis for officer plans. The strength planner works closely with the OCMs, accessions and promotions planner to determine the projected losses and required gains and promotions to achieve end strength targets.

The accession planning process begins early in the year after the community end strength control is received from the strength planners. Requirements (by commissioning source) are solicited from the community managers. A preliminary plan is then reviewed by OCMs, Warfare

Sponsors (N8), the Naval Academy, CNRC and CNET. Once any conflicts are resolved, the plan is forwarded to the Admiral (N13) for approval.<sup>50</sup>

**(2) Promotion Planning.** Officer promotion planners allocate promotion totals based on authorized end strength, billet requirements, and the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). They determine the number of officers to be promoted to the grades of Lieutenant through Captain for the next five years. This is a vacancy driven system where the number promoted must be determined by estimating the number of gains required to offset losses to meet end strength authorizations. Promotion planners use the following formula:

$$\text{Promotions} = \text{Authorized End Strength} - \text{Begin Strength} - \text{Gains} + \text{Losses}$$

DOPMA constraints are set for the percentage of officers that must be promoted to a given rank. This percentage along with the number of required promotions determines the “zone” size. The zone is the size of the officer population at the rank being considered for promotion and is determined by lineal number seniority within that paygrade.<sup>51</sup>

#### *b. Officer Career Development (N132E)*

The Officer Career Development section is responsible for a variety of activities. The responsibilities include:

- Develop policy on non-designator specific career issues and overall career paths
- Plan and manage officer graduate education and subspecialty requirements
- Coordinate and conduct annual Major Command Review board
- Curriculum sponsor for Manpower Systems Analysis subspecialty (XX33)<sup>52</sup>

Prior to the drawdown, fourteen personnel managed the responsibilities of this section. Presently there are four personnel responsible for the basically the same functions. The shortage in personnel has reduced the efforts to the daily management of the subspecialty and graduate education quota systems, foregoing planning and analysis.

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<sup>50</sup> Information derived from briefing material on Officer Strength Planning.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> N13 Command Briefing material.

*c. Officer Community Management (N132D)*

The OCMs are responsible for the shaping of the individual communities. They must monitor accessions, retention, career path, and any emergent community problems. The OCMs must also provide the strength planner with input so that accurate budgeting can be accomplished.


OCMs are charged with the overall health of their communities, in terms of the quality of officers, their careers and career milestones, meeting end strength, retention, losses, and promotion flowpoints. Each community has its own peculiarities. Some communities have too many people and they must address ways to entice people to leave to ensure upward mobility. Other communities need more people and they are primarily concerned with recruitment and retention. The OCMs work for the Head Officer Plans and Policy Branch and the Head OCM, who are supposed to coordinate and “deconflict” between the communities. They must ensure that something done for one community does not negatively impact another. In addition, OCMs also work informally for the Head Detailer and Resource Sponsor as explained below:

So the Community Manager is really kind of triple hatted. They work for me, but they also have to work for their own community, as say the Aviation Community Manager. He certainly is working for me, but he is also working for Admiral McGinn in N88 and he also works for the head detailer, because that's the execution side of all this. To come up with policies that couldn't be executed wouldn't be very smart. So, he's always working those kinds of issues. He knows where his bread is buttered.

I figured out a little bit on my own, but when I came here the Captain (Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch) sat me down and told me some words I remember very clearly, that although he would write my fitness reports, realize who all your bosses are and remember the CNO is also an aviator and he's very interested in what happens to the aviation community. And that's very typical in the Surface and Submarine Communities as well. Talk to Submariners, they don't do anything without calling Naval Reactors and likewise the senior naval aviators want to try and direct the community and manpower is a very sensitive issue.

Each community requires its own policies and plans due to its own unique demands. For instance, the community specific incentive pay, such as ACIP (Aviation Career Incentive Pay)

and NOIP (Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay) must be monitored by the community managers to meet end strength controls and to meet community requirements. Like the enlisted communities, there are many common tasks, i.e., promotion and strength planning. There is some sharing of ideas between the OCMs during periodic meetings, but no standardized practices exist for accomplishing the required tasks. Each OCM works independently, often having to coordinate more with external agencies than internal. For example, the Aviation OCM coordinates extensively with Pers-43 (Aviation detailer), N88 (Aviation Resource Sponsor), N889 (Aviation Resource Sponsor, Manpower and Training division), CNET, CNATRA (Chief of Naval Air Training), and CNRC, N130. **Figure (4-8)** illustrates the OCM coordination requirements.



**Figure 4-8.** Officer Community Manager (OCM) Coordination Agencies

The level of coordination is often left to the individual community manager. The aviation OCM held official quarterly meetings with the aviation detailers (prior to the move) where policy issues were discussed to give detailers advanced notice of upcoming policy changes. He also held bimonthly meetings with the detailers where they discussed other relevant issues. The aviation OCM fears that the move of the detailers to Millington will cause coordination problems:

I think we're going to lose how policies really affect the people. I hope they don't. We're going to get the money and go out there and do a quarterly visit and brief them on that stuff. Right now I don't see it as a big issue, but when I leave and

they leave...hopefully we can keep the rapport going, but naturally it's going to disintegrate a bit. It's too far away and we'll start becoming isolated.

Like the ECMs, much of the work of the OCM is handling emergent tasking, building briefs, answering phone calls, e-mail, and questions, and developing point papers. According to the Surface Warfare OCM:

*I spend most of my time during the day putting out fires and repeating myself quite a bit.* How is retention in the service? Well, it doesn't really change that fast. But I answer that question frequently. We have a lot of Flag Officers meeting here in town and every one wants the similar data and everybody has their own questions.

Prior to the move to Millington, OCMs spent a tremendous amount of time reacting to the daily issues, which precluded any sort of long-range planning. The Aviation OCM believes that some of this time will be reduced because of the move, due to the detailers being forced to handle the daily issues that the community manager currently does. This extra time may allow the OCM to do more of the long-range planning that they previously have not found the time for.

They'll (the detailers) just handle it. And maybe they won't handle it the way we would, but there is more than one way to skin a cat. So, I think a lot of personnel waiver type issues will fall more on their shoulders. We'll set up the policies and guidelines for waivers and it will wander and we'll have to bring it back in line. We'll have to keep realigning ourselves. But, there's some thought that maybe now we'll be able to do some more bigger picture planning.<sup>53</sup>


#### 4. Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management Branch (N133)

The Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management branch serves as the single point of contact between CNP and the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. They are responsible for personnel career management policies for nuclear-trained enlisted, LDO/Warrant, and URL officers and consist of six officers, three enlisted and one civilian personnel.

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<sup>53</sup> Interview with Aviation OCM

This is probably the least visible of the four branches due to the nature of the Nuclear community. This branch was not the primary focus of this thesis, however, the organizational structure is shown in **Figure (4-9)** and a brief discussion is provided.



**Figure 4-9.** N133, Nuclear Propulsion Programs Management Branch

This branch is separated physically from the rest of N13. They are located in the 7<sup>th</sup> Wing of the Annex. Their primary function is to establish and administer all personnel policies associated with the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. They must also plan and administer all nuclear officer and enlisted accession and bonus programs. They also serve as the single point of contact for all matters associated with the nuclear propulsion program, military Congressional liaison. In addition, they are responsible for administering the officer and enlisted submarine pay programs.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> From N133 web page (August 1998)

The nuclear Navy is separate in many regards from the rest of the fleet, due to the political ramifications of nuclear power. They make no decisions without the approval of the Head of Naval Reactors- and this includes all personnel issues.

These officers have spent long hours to build and maintain their databases. Due to the rapid turnover there is very little corporate knowledge, so they work hard to save historical data. They are accustomed to hard work and long hours onboard a submarine and it is no different in this branch.

Nuclear programs take up a lot of additional time...I work from 0600-2000 Monday through Friday and occasionally on weekends.

Most outside observers, while maybe not liking their apparent aloofness, concede that the "Nukes" seem to manage their communities and programs very well.

## E. THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MODELS

There are numerous models and information systems available for N13 decision-makers. Information systems are designed to provide personnel with access to data. On the other hand, models use data for a specific purpose. Manpower models are designed to help planners determine the numbers and types of people needed to perform specific tasks. Personnel models are used to predict the likely outcomes of changes to personnel policy, and assignment models are designed to match individuals with jobs in such a way to maximize some objective function, subject to a set of constraints.<sup>55</sup>

The manpower and personnel information system is a complex arrangement, and has been upgraded and modified over time and has become a tangled web of systems added upon systems. This has created the need for new programs that can translate or display certain elements of the data from other systems. The result is an overall system that is hard to understand and gives inconsistent data, dependent on the individual system it was obtained from. N1B, observed:

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<sup>55</sup> Bernard Rostker, "Human Resource Models: An Overview," Professional Paper No. 370, Center for Naval Analyses, Nov 1982.

"If you have to start with a clean piece of paper this (points at diagram of manpower and personnel information system) is probably not what you'd draw. One would think that with all the technology we have today, that we should have an integrated Personnel and Pay system, that we should have all the information about people and billets, and a relational database in which you could go in and pull up what you wanted. I mean everything should be in one huge databank so you can sort whatever anyway you want to. We don't have that. We've got to go to this (points to diagram) to get that kind of data, and it's inconsistent."

Each branch of N13 requires the use of models for a wide variety of purposes. There are manpower models to assist in strength planning and community management for both the officer and enlisted communities. In addition, there are also personnel models to assist in determining bonus levels and compensation packages. This section begins with a description of each of the models available to the N13 personnel.<sup>56</sup> After describing the "theoretical" system, N13 personnel' perceptions of the available technology are discussed.


## **1. Available Models and Information Systems**

### *a. Officer Systems*

An overview of the Officer information systems and models is shown in **Figure 4-10**. The Strength planning models are used in conjunction with the accession and promotion planning model to determine accessions, losses, and associated policies to arrive at required end strength. The Navy Officer Personnel Planning Model (NOPPS II) is a tool used for developing officer strength plans. It aggregates and collates inputs from the officer community managers and produces a detailed strength plan. It tracks inventories, losses, and promotions.

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<sup>56</sup> Derived from briefing material on Navy Personnel Models and Informations Systems, 1998



**Figure 4-10.** Officer Information System Overview

The Officer Forecasting model (STRAP-O) is used with the Officer Community Forecasting model (SKIPPER-O) to conduct policy analysis for officers. STRAP-O provides analysis for officer strength planning and community management. It uses historical loss results to forecast future inventory by paygrade and year group. It looks at all unrestricted line and restricted line to build an all-Navy forecast. In addition, it forecasts accessions required to meet end strength and promotions needed to fill vacancies. SKIPPER-O is a community specific model used to evaluate individual community strength plans and forecast accession requirements. It is relatively simple to use and based on continuation rates.

For accession planning, Accession Planning Support Software (APSS) is available to assist in planning annual accession requirements. The Officer Promotion Planning Model

(OPPM) calculates promotion vacancies and projects community flowpoints based on predicted zone sizes.

Two databases are commonly used by OCMs: the Officer Personnel Information System (OPIS), and TARGET. OPIS is a tool to provide officer planners and managers with easily accessible information. It provides historical information on:


- Inventories by community, paygrade, years commissioned service (YCS), and gender
- Promotions
- Retention / Continuation rates
- Losses and Gains

TARGET enables officer planners, community managers, and analysts to query either the officer master file or the officer billet file data. Currently, the system is limited to only the most recent end-of-month files for ad hoc queries. Future plans are for building a “data warehouse” which will provide access to historical master and billet files.

#### *b. Enlisted Systems*

A different set of models is used for enlisted strength planning and community management. **Figure (4-11)** is an overview of this system. Strength Planning Analysis Model (SPAN) combines the output from three models in generating the total strength plan and determines the required accessions and advancements to balance the end strength equation.


- **OSCAR** (Obligated Service Contract Analysis Report): Tracks and forecasts End of active obligated service (EAOS) actions by examining the actual EAOS base each month. Looks at first-term and career and is based on historical loss behavior at EAOS.
- **RETIR** (Retirement Model): Forecasts retirements and Fleet Reserve transfers as a function of the Length-Of-Service (LOS)-eligible population during the fiscal year.
- **NET** (Navy Attrition Model): Forecasts attrition losses. Attrition is based on historical rates applied to paygrade begin strength. The historical rate can be manually overridden.



**Figure 4-11** Enlisted Strength Planning Information System

The Navy Enlisted Force Analysis Model (NEFAM) is a tool used for forecasting the enlisted force by paygrade and LOS. It is used to project the average seniority levels of the force and the impact of various policies on advancements and accession requirements.

Numerous models are available to the ECMs to assist in inventory forecasting, accession planning, school planning, and setting policy on sea/shore rotation. **Figure (4-12)** is an overview of this system.



Source: N13T brief on Navy Personnel Models and Information Systems

**Figure 4-12.** Enlisted Community Management Information Systems

The Skilled Personnel Projection for Enlisted Retention (SKIPPER) model enables ECMS to forecast community manning and accession requirements under alternative scenarios. It consists of three components; inventory projection, a reenlistment control model, and automated accession planning. The goal is to minimize the difference between authorizations and projected inventory. The Community Optimization Using Robust Techniques for Navy Enlisted Yields (COURTNEY) is used to forecast sea/shore rotations for communities. Minimized Statistics (MINSTATS) is used to provide summary statistical reports for enlisted ratings and programs for enlisted community management. The information is used in enlisted readiness briefings. Accession Incentive Management System (AIMS) is a flexible information delivery system that provides data on rating and enlistment program quotas, numbers of contracts written against these quotas, and previous "sales" history of these ratings and programs. TARGET is an information delivery system

that allows queries of the enlisted master file or the enlisted billet file and works exactly like the TARGET system used for officers.

*c) Compensation Models*

There are also several models available to the Compensation and Policy Branch. The ROGER model is used to develop the enlisted SRB program. It projects the number of reenlistments for alternative bonus levels. It estimates the cost of the bonus plan and projects the retention effect on individual skills. The results are used in SKIPPER to project skill inventories. The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model forecasts the impact of compensation and economic factors on enlisted retention. In doing this, it controls for the impact of sea/shore rotation and demographic variables. It is used to analyze the retention effect of various pay and compensation policies, civilian economy, and retirement system changes. Compensation and Policy personnel use other databases (RISK and OTIS) to assist in answering Board of Correction of Navy Records (BCNR) and congressional questions about specific individuals or entitlements.

## **2. Problems and Perceptions**

Many people familiar with the models and information systems agree that there are fundamental problems. While there appears to be ample models and information systems, many are not actually used, and the majority are out-dated and/or not user friendly. N13 personnel learn the basics of their job during turnover, and tend to use the models and databases their predecessors found useful. Many claim to have sufficient data, but not in the right format. There are also complaints that there is not enough capability to analyze the data and information. Some of the models are so old that to update them would be impractical, and there isn't enough money for new systems.

"One of our biggest problems is trying to figure out what effect different programs have on human behavior. Now there are very few things harder to predict than human behavior. Not only that, these models need to be updated, for instance, the SRB model isn't working anymore."

Historically, BUPERS has only had enough money available to maintain and in some cases upgrade the existing system. This is not the right approach according to N1B, "Technologists will

tell you that you're better off to build a new system than to try and back-fit and fix." The Year 2000 (Y2K) problem (programming glitch that may cause many systems to crash on January 1, 2000) has made the Navy not able to defer, because a great deal of money must be spent just to fix that problem on an archaic system. Parts of the old system need to be eliminated or simplified.<sup>57</sup> The following are some of the perceptions and opinions of various personnel in N13 about the models they have available.<sup>58</sup>

- I don't profess to really understand them, but I guess I'm satisfied.
- The models now available to the ECMs are sufficient to do the job. The systems do need upgrades so that different databases can actually "talk" to each other.
- I am largely satisfied. The key is ensuring you know all the default settings and how the model uses the information to arrive at an answer.
- I use the HIGHLANDER and OTIS databases. I was given a two hour training course on them when I got here.
- I'm getting better at getting the information I need. **I probably should have gotten more training** on how to pull a lot of this stuff out.
- The money we have gotten for the models has allowed us to sustain but not improve the model. In other words, if we have a minor problem with a model we can go in and trouble shoot it. But if we want to add bells and whistles and try to upgrade it, we don't have the money for it... We have Community Managers over here that are making decisions based on an excel spreadsheet....**there needs to be one model that can make all of the decisions instead of one model for each problem.**
- It's not put out in a format that's really useful. When you've got five or six or eight different models that you can pull from and each one gives you something a little different, which one do you use? And if you don't even understand modeling, so you don't appreciate the variables you played with or even know you can play with the variables, how can you determine and make competent decisions if you haven't been taught how to use it in the first place?

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<sup>57</sup> From interview with N1B

<sup>58</sup> From interviews and questionnaire responses

## **F. THE PEOPLE**

Having discussed the mission, leadership, the individual branches of N13, and technology, the focus shifts now to the workers themselves. This section is important in understanding N13 and on a bigger scale, the Navy itself. There is a wide variation in the types and background of people in N13 depending on the particular branch and assignment. Overall, these are mainly mid-grade to senior officer and enlisted personnel with a great deal of experience and respect in their individual communities.

There are relatively few Navy organizations that are this diverse in terms of a community melting pot. Each Navy community tends to attract a different sort of individual. For instance, submariners are generally recruited from the top of their Naval Academy class with a strong engineering background. On the other hand, aviators recruited from a variety of accession sources and academic backgrounds. Most URL officers are accustomed to working primarily within their community. This N13 organization brings all the communities together, requiring everyone to make adjustments.

The manpower and personnel experience varies dramatically. The Fleet Support officers (FSO) are trained specialists in this type of work while the Staff, Unrestricted (URL) and Restricted (RL) Line officers who are often getting their first exposure. While the FSO often knows the system and has the work experience, the Staff, URL and RL officers bring community experience to the job. The blend of these officers is deemed important in this branch as noted by many of the personnel interviewed.

The billets themselves tell a lot about the people. Most N13 billets require a subspecialty code (SSC), which means that people with special skills (obtained from education or experience) are supposed to fill these jobs. Historically, the Navy has had a difficulty meeting the Navy or DoD requirements for utilization of SSC officers and also of filling SSC billets. The DoD requires that all officers who receive a subspecialty code through a fully funded graduate education program do a "pay back" tour within the next two tours. The Navy has relaxed that requirement to two shore

tours and still has a problem filling SSC billets and utilizing its officers. The following are the various ways that a SSC billet can be filled:<sup>59</sup>

- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| (1) Direct Fill -          | Coded billet that is filled with an officer with that specific subspecialty,  |
| (2) Closely Related Fill - | Coded billet that is filled with an officer with a related subspecialty   |
| (3) Other Fill -           | Coded billet that is filled by an officer does not have a subspecialty code or a subspecialty code related to that specific billet, and |
| (4) Gapped Billet -        | Coded billet that does not have an officer currently assigned to it.  |
| (5) Experience Fill -      | Coded billet that is filled by an officer that holds the experience subspecialty code for that specific subspecialty.                   |

The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) computed the Billet Fill Rate as shown in **Table (4-1)**. It gives a "snapshot" view of how well the assignment process is "utilizing" the graduate education and subspecialty system. The Navy is able to fill less than half of its coded billets with a direct fill or closely related fill. The Officer Career Development section, responsible for Graduate Education and Subspecialty system, is currently working on this issue. This impacts N13 directly through the people that currently fill billets created for subspecialists. According to an N13 liaison:

"Most of the billets are P-coded, but how often do you get an ECM with that type of background? Probably about one out of ten."

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<sup>59</sup> R.B. Reese, "Subspecialty Status Report," 23 October 1995, Encl. 1, p. 3.

	Direct Fill	Closely Related Fill	Other Fill	Gapped Billet	Total Billets w/ P-code	% Direct Fill	% Direct/ Related
URL/RL							
Subtotal	1143	404	1396	414	3357	<b>34.0%</b>	<b>46.1%</b>
Staff							
Subtotal	532	167	365	114	1175	<b>45.3%</b>	<b>59.5%</b>
Overall							
Total	1675	571	1761	528	4532	<b>37.0%</b>	<b>49.6%</b>

**Table 4-1.** Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Method for Billet Fill Rate(Sept. 96 Data)<sup>60</sup>

The majority of the workers are military, but there are a few interspersed civilian positions. While military members bring the fleet knowledge and experience, civilians can often provide the corporate memory and expertise in other areas. They can also play important coordination roles with outside civilian agencies. N13 employs 12 civilians, who are divided among the various departments. According to N1B:

There's a blend of military and civilian that you need to have. I think you need to have civilians there who know the data systems, processes and stuff and can help the military officers get some of the background experience. I don't know if we've got the right mix yet.

Dealing with constant turnover is a fact of life in the military. While the FSO typically remains three years in a billet, the URL officers generally remain only about two years due to the compressed career path, which requires officers to "punch numerous tickets" on the path to command. Frustrated with this rapid turnover is the enlisted strength planner, an FSO who claims that it takes about two years for someone to become fully qualified in that job.

... The warfare (URL) guys typically come in for 2 years. So right about the time they are cresting on that, "I know it all, I can do it all, I can pump out a Powerpoint slide, I can turn around a Congressional question in an hour" – they're out the door.

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<sup>60</sup> Linda Cavalluzzo, and Donald Cymrot, "A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools," Center for Naval Analyses, (January 1998), p. 63.

The 1700's (FSOs) typically come in for three years. It's not that I don't want warfare guys, it's just that I hate to lose them. I really want that third year. It's less of a burden on me if I have more people that can respond quicker.

Some of the main side effects of constant turnover in an organization are the loss of historical data, continuity, and corporate memory. This is especially damaging to an organization that is required to make the numerous decisions and answer questions from other agencies with a similar lack of corporate history (i.e., Congress, DoD organizations). Lessons are continually learned and relearned.

The biggest truth in Washington is that nothing is new. You see these ideas come up over and over again. It certainly helps to have a good filing system or to have some continuity.

## **G. HUMAN RESOURCES**

The human resource side of the organization involves the selection, training and rewarding of personnel. This section will look at these three areas in some detail.

### **1. Selection**

N13 selects their personnel in the same way as all other Navy organizations. They rely on the distribution system of detailers and placement officers to bring the best available personnel into the organization. This results in a quality spread based on each community's job assignment priorities. Differences in communities, both in terms of overall quality and career path philosophies, result in some N13 jobs being stepping stones for promotion and the command path, while others are more geared for retirement.

The submarine community is an example of a community with both a high quality of personnel and a realization of the importance of these jobs. They not only send high quality personnel, but they also intentionally plan for a two to three month turnover to minimize the drop-off in production that occurs during job turnover. Other communities are not as meticulous in filling these billets. Many community managers retire from military life after their tours in N13. This is not to say that these people are not performing well, but undoubtedly they are distracted from their work as they approach this critical time in their lives.

## **2. Training**

Training is a key ingredient of any organization. The initial training received has a tremendous effect on the quality of work as well as the impression of the new member of the command. N13 relies almost exclusively on on-the-job training (OJT) to teach new personnel the job. This practice of "turnover" is not just limited to N13, as the Navy job training system is largely built around OJT. Most jobs in ships and squadrons rely almost exclusively on OJT to bring new personnel up to speed quickly with the intricacies of an individual job. This requires coordination between the detailers and placement officers to ensure an adequate overlap for turnover.

In N13, the job of Branch Head has been acknowledged as too difficult to initially assume. The Branch Heads have developed a system of "fleeting up" from Deputy to Director. They spend the first half of their tour as the Deputy learning the job, and then become the Branch Head for the remainder of their tour. This is prudent, but as the following N13 personnel noted, even that may be insufficient.

We try and keep the continuity here. I was over there (Deputy) and he'll be there a year and when I leave he'll fleet up, because the importance of having continuity here is recognized. We just can't walk in here and start out fresh. You just can't do it.

My Captain is getting ready to walk out the door. They new guy is fleeting up. He freely admits, "I don't understand half of what you do." I'll spend the next year trying to get him comfortable so that he understands the other side of the job.

The length and quality of the turnover varies widely. Generally speaking, the turnover is done over a period of days or weeks. This is the preferred method, but since many of the job tasks are only done at certain times of the year (i.e. advancement cycles), some processes are left for the person to learn through experience. The worst case scenario is when a billet is "gapped," meaning the job is vacant for a period of time. This means there is literally no turnover and the unlucky new arrival must rely on other personnel from the section for help. The following is a comment from an ECM who was the unfortunate recipient of a gapped turnover.

I had a no-face-to-face passdown from my predecessor. Everything I know about this job is based on OJT from my Technical Advisor and discussions with other ECMs.

Even in the best of situations, OJT alone is not an ideal means of training a person new to this type of work. The incoming person often does not have the required background knowledge to understand the context of the job. An N13 person, realizing that OJT was insufficient without the necessary job context said:

I mean quite frankly you get a week's turnover and then you experience everything.

For those previously experienced with this type work, a quick turnover may be sufficient, but for the rest, understanding only comes through the "trial by fire" method. N13 personnel typically reported taking from six months to a year to become comfortable with the new job. According to the Deputy Director of Manpower and Personnel (N1B), new personnel shouldn't have to spend that long learning how the organization and the job work. He noted:

They spoon fed me when I came in, but I know that doesn't happen to a LCDR checking in down in N13. They need to understand what the whole process is and in detail in certain areas.

A typical person checking in to N13 receives very little or no indoctrination into the manpower and personnel world. Those without the background experience in manpower and personnel undergo a great deal of stress during the first six months to a year learning the buzzwords and basic knowledge to survive. One ECM bluntly put it:

I've gotten no turnover or training, so I have to go find the answers myself. Meanwhile, I'm running 35 or 40 thousand peoples' lives and I don't know how to do it.

Not only are personnel unfamiliar with the nature of manpower and personnel system, many are unskilled with the basic tools for survival in an environment where almost everyone is expected to build and give briefs, write point papers, and use and understand the various models available to them. Those new to the Washington environment must get accustomed to a different way of doing business. Some N13 personnel check onboard with many of the skills while others check-in with none.

The following comments are from various N13 personnel on the initial training.

- It depends on how computer literate you are when you get onboard. I don't think it takes someone very long to figure out Travel entitlements- here's the

book, here's where all your references are, here's the guys you call when you have some questions... Getting into learning to write Washington memos and those kinds of things- sometimes that's the hard part. There's an OPNAV Action Officer course that kind of goes over it. Hopefully you pick it up from someone in your section. A lot of it is just getting your work chopped up and sent back... That's one of those things that you can't just sit down in the classroom and learn. They certainly need to understand how what they do affects people.

- They should probably have a one week training course here. They could teach you how to make briefs in Powerpoint, how to make spreadsheets, how to pull from databases. That week would save lots of pain. Also e-mail and how other communication systems work. The more I learn the more I realize I don't know.
- We need to know what the budget process is, what strength planning is, why it's important for us. But when this should all be done is an enroute delay. You could get an Action Officer course, a budget course, a Manpower course that goes into strength planning and you'd know what the terms are. When my relief comes in we should get a long turnover so that we can get a lot of this stuff done.
- There should be a formal training program established to assist new and experienced ECMs with routine and special projects associated with the job.
- It would indeed be nice to have an ECM bible - "go-by" (even if only "topical" in nature) to assist in the turn-over process. It would have to be similar to a 3-ring binder (since policy/systems/processes/programs, etc.) are in continual change.

The OJT method of job training has resulted in a lack of standardization. Although there are many periodic and common tasks, there are no common methods for accomplishing them. Rather, each person accomplishes tasks based on the training they received during turnover. As N1B noted:

If the turnover is good the person who is going to do it now is going to do it just like the one before. Which may or may not be the right way. We need to get down how we do business.

The lack of standardization often results in confusion, especially for a new N13 person who may see several different approaches to the same work. Most ECMs agree that many of the tasks

should be standardized while allowing that there is some necessary variation between the communities. An ECM Tutorial, produced by NPRDC in 1994, was designed to be a "cookbook" for the community managers in how to do ECM tasks.<sup>61</sup> However, the majority of the ECMs have never heard of this tutorial. Of the few that have seen it, most find it too complicated and may only use it as an occasional reference. The following are quotes from various ECMs in response to a question on standardization.<sup>62</sup>

- "We have basic guidelines we all use, but the individual communities dictate how they need to be managed. Each community has its own peculiarities. There are several areas (i.e. advancement planning) where standardization would probably be of benefit to all."
- Since every community is different and making headway towards correcting individual community shortfall sometimes becomes a political endeavor, there appears to be different methods in the community management business. And yes, there should be a standardized method to level the playing field.
- Admittedly, ECM's learn OJT (as passed down). However, there are "standard" procedures and policies (documented (Manuals, Instructions, Policy Decisions, NAVADMINS, etc.), OJT "passed down" and Tasking "passed along") for performing many functions (advancements, accessions, HYT/RET/FLTRES, TERA, NEC award/removals) – and admittedly (again) there may be great variance in "process and decision matrix" amongst ECMs. Commonality of "process" is always good at the "get-go" - but many of the "variances" are essential for most due to the community and occupation supported.
- We have basic guidelines we all use, but the individual communities dictate how they need to be managed. Each community has its own peculiarities. There are several areas (i.e. advancement planning) where standardization would probably be of benefit to all, but for the most part, an overall policy of standardization would be difficult to go by.
- ECMs and OCMs need more training to understand the output of the models and they need training in analysis.

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<sup>61</sup> Navy Personnel, Research and Development Center, *ECM Tutorial*, November 1994.

<sup>62</sup> From ECM questionnaire responses

- Every community is different. There is no “book way.” Some guys do it well, some don’t. A lot depends on the rating. Some are easier than others in that they basically run themselves. Others require more work...*Maybe there is a slight difference between the communities, but about 95% is common between the ratings and should be standardized.*

### 3. Rewards

All Navy organizations rely on the traditional rewards system to encourage their best workers. This type of system is used to reward excellent work after the end of a tour, but even this system has lost a lot of its luster due to the traditional end-of-tour awards becoming a standard “good-bye gift” in most communities. These long-time professionals realize that the ultimate extrinsic reward in the Navy is promotion, which brings both additional pay and prestige. Most of the officers are far enough along in their careers to assess their chances for another promotion with the result being that some will be more motivated than others.

The “perks” of seniority are often considered compensation for military members. However, these “perks” are almost non-existent in the Washington environment. Where Commanders and Captains are almost treated like royalty in other Navy environments, on Capitol Hill, they are “just another O-5 or O-6.” This can be a difficult pill to swallow for someone arriving from the fleet. For example, even with a large portion of the Navy Annex temporarily vacant, there is still no parking available. Captains are complaining about not having a parking pass, while low ranking civilians are parking near the building.

Intrinsically this is very rewarding work because N13 personnel feel they can have a direct positive impact on fellow service members’ lives and careers. As one new ECM stated, “Every time a kid calls me with a big career decision and I can help him, I feel good.”

Many of the workers are satisfied with the job and see little difference between this and other commands. Everyone acknowledged that leadership at the executive and branch level is outstanding and generally very supportive. Many N13 personnel are quite senior and familiar with the intricacies of Navy life. Others, realizing that a business would not function this way are less than satisfied. As one ECM who questioned this mentality stated:

Some senior guys may say, “Well, that’s the way we’ve always done it in the Navy.” It’s like a badge of honor with them and that’s just not the right way to treat

people...I got no turnover, no training, no sponsor, no "welcome aboard" from the boss, It surprised me...Why am I doing this?

## H. A FINAL LOOK

N13 is an organization going through a great deal of change. The downsizing, the split of BUPERS, and the reduced budget have put the organization under a great deal of stress. One N13 personnel made the following comment:

It's like the game of "Pick Up Sticks." You can take out so many sticks without any apparent sign, then pull one and it collapses. Was it the one stick or all the ones you pulled out first?

Many things get "dropped through the cracks." Fewer personnel are available to do the same number of tasks, so sometimes the volume of work to do in a day becomes overwhelming. The Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch made the following comment:

It's just like you would do on a ship or in a squadron where everybody has more tasks than they can do in a day. So, everyday is a thing of prioritizing and that which is most important to be done in a day or in a week you do that, and the other things suffer.

N13 is an organization stretched to the limits. Previous "successful" methods for dealing with problems typically involved more money and/or personnel. These methods are no longer readily available and new solutions are needed to solve recurring problems. Many N13 personnel have ideas on how to improve their part of the organization. For example, the Assistant Bonus Programs officer is frustrated with the current structure because the Enlisted Bonus (EB) program under his control competes directly with the Navy College Fund (NCF), which is controlled by Pers-6 in Millington. Merging these functions and providing some administrative support are two immediate suggestions that he feels would benefit his particular area. Ideas such as these should be encouraged and then, when appropriate, be incorporated into the organization.

Chapter V uses the description provided in this chapter for viewing the N13 organization in a systems framework. This framework can then be used to develop a systematic plan for change, using the inputs of the N13 personnel.



## **V. ANALYSIS OF N13**


### **A. OVERVIEW**

The analysis uses the Systems model to provide a framework for including all relevant aspects of the N13 organization. A macro view of the organization can assist leaders and managers by linking and discussing factors affecting organizational performance as a holistic system. The systems approach allows leaders to understand how changes in one area affect other parts of the organization, and how strategy, structure, environment, processes and subsystems (i.e., selection, training, rewards, information systems, and communications) affect the culture, outputs, and outcomes. The Systems model can be used as a tool to assist managers to improve overall organizational performance.


The Mintzberg model is also used to show the effects of the 1990s drawdown pertaining to N13. The Configuration model is the final framework used, due to its relevance in placing organizations into one of four configurations based on the level of efficiency and effectiveness. This last model is used to depict “Political-Reactive” types of organizations, i.e., N13.

### **B. N13 SYSTEMS MODEL**

The Systems model is a framework for viewing an organization holistically in terms of its internal components and external environment. The model consists of design factors which are shaped by the organization's context, key success factors, and strategic direction. These, combined with organizational culture, influence outputs and outcomes. **Figure (5-1)** is the “generic” Systems model discussed in Chapter II. **Figure (5-2)** is an adaptation of the Systems model in terms of the N13 organization. Figure 5-2 translates results of analysis into the various categories captured by the generic model. A discussion of each component follows.



**Figure 5-1.** The Systems Model Revisited (Source: Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998.)



**Figure 5-2. N13 Systems Model**

## **1. Context**

N13, not unlike many other DoD organizations, is greatly influenced by its external environment, resources and history. The political environment is particularly relevant to the context of N13, including budgetary warfare and the PPBS. Competition between agencies for resources, power, and prestige is a strong driver in this and other bureaucratic institutions. Former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) General David Jones, described the defense budget as an “intramural scramble for resources.”<sup>63</sup> This “scramble” includes the competition between the Navy and other services, as well as within the Navy itself, for control of dollars and political capital. For example, while N1 (CNP) lobbies for more money for personnel, N8 (Resource Sponsors) seeks more money for new ships, submarines, and airplanes.<sup>64</sup> Congress seeks to trim costs while thwarting the necessity to close additional bases.

The external economic environment also affects N13. The economic boon of the 1990s, and the corresponding drop in unemployment has adversely impacted recruiting and retention. This year the Navy predicts that it will fall well short of meeting recruiting and end strength requirements.<sup>65</sup>

The social environment of the country also impacts N13. Although the military remains a “trusted” institution by American society, the FY97 DoD Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) reflects a drop in propensity toward joining the military, and the Navy continues to trail the other services.<sup>66</sup> Many social issues such as race, gender integration, women in combat, and even AIDS can influence N13 policy, planning, and criteria for success.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, *The New Politics of the Budgetary Process*: Addison-Wesley: New York, 1996, p. 224.

<sup>64</sup> In testimony before the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 12 March 1998, Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) VADM Daniel Oliver lobbied for end strength flexibility and a fully funded manpower account.

<sup>65</sup> VADM Daniel Oliver, In testimony to Subcommittee on Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 1998, p. 4. (<http://www.house.gov/nsc/3-12-98oliver-mcgann.htm>)

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* p. 4.


<sup>67</sup> In November of 1993, the Secretary of the Navy set the “12-12-5” (12% Black, 12% Hispanic, 5% Other) goal for officer accessions in the Navy. The objective was to gradually reach this goal, based on Census Bureau projections of the population mix.

N13 is resource constrained. The budget and available personnel are limited, which paradoxically contradicts the persistently high operating and personnel tempos. During the Cold War, resources were plentiful, and the Navy could survive inefficiencies in the system by applying more people and money to a problem. Inefficiencies in the system are more obvious, now that a substantial portion of the personnel and the budget have been eradicated.

Organizational history also contributes to overall context. The repetitive turnover among military personnel seriously diffuses corporate memory. As several N13 personnel noted, the same issues keep reoccurring and personnel are continually trying to "reinvent the wheel."

## 2. Key Success Factors

Determining a complete set of key success factors is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, two factors are apparent. First, this is a "reactive" organization, that at the very least, must give the appearance of responsiveness to its many stakeholders. Second, N13 relies on extensive lateral coordination with various stakeholders as a key success factor (see **Figure (5-3)**).



**Figure 5-3.** N13 lateral coordination

## 3. System Direction

The mission statements given by N13 personnel describe an attempt to balance the needs of the fleet with individuals in a constrained fiscal environment. Reactive organizations constantly adjust priorities to meet emergent needs. Continually shifting priorities fragments mission clarity and may suboptimize performance.

The constant turnover at all levels in the organization does not allow for the continuity necessary to develop and maintain organizational direction. Leaders, managers and employees are all busy handling daily issues and emerging crises. The point is that unless the ill effects of loss of corporate memory brought on by systemic turnover are not countered, then the organization must consign itself to relearning its mistakes over and over again.

#### **4. Design Factors**

##### *a. Technology and Tasks*

After studying the mission and tasks of N13, the following three processes are considered basic technologies critical to the organization.

- N13 translates Congressional end strength requirements into plans and policies, which achieve the desired numbers by the end of each fiscal year.
- N13 builds the Navy community-by-community to ensure a fleet manned to meet mission requirements in the ROC/POE. This includes shaping the force by monitoring inputs (recruiting) and outputs (separations).
- N13 is responsible for monitoring the career development of all Fleet personnel. This includes training, advancement, pay and compensation.

The tasks vary from simple to complex, but almost all involve extensive lateral coordination inside and outside N13. The process of meeting end strength requirements is the fairly straightforward task of determining the numbers to recruit, promote, and retain in each community. The shaping of the fleet and meeting individual career needs is more difficult and complex. This requires some variation in the programs and policies used to affect individual behavior.

Performing the core tasks occupies the least amount of time. The majority of the work hours involve handling emerging issues, which may or may not contribute to the main functions. This work involves answering phone calls and e-mail, handling congressional inquiries, building briefs, and other management taskings.

Although there is a great deal of similar type work being done by all community managers, there is minimal standardization and no apparent process for capturing and

communicating lessons learned or new ideas. Almost every Community Manager felt that certain tasks could benefit from standardization of process.

*b. Structure*

N13 is structured as a traditional military, top-down hierarchy. The branches are grouped partially by “market” (Officer and Enlisted Plans and Policy) and also by function (Nuclear Programs and Compensation). This structure appears to be misaligned with the mission and creates confusion as to the primary purpose of N13. The Officer and Enlisted Plans and Policy branch is clearly at the core of the previously described tasks and technologies. These branches are mirror images of each other in nearly every way, but interaction between them is unclear. Each has a separate Strength Planning section, Career Development (Training) section, and Promotion (Advancement) section. The Compensation and Nuclear Plans and Policy branches appear to be supporting the primary branches in some ways, but the explicit support relationship is not clear.


There is a strong reliance on the informal lateral coordination among personnel at the same level, but gaps in the vertical coordination through the chain of command. The organizational structure and internal lateral coordination is depicted in **Figure (5-4)**. While interaction is necessary to fulfill the mission, the division of labor does not appear to promote teamwork. Each community is divided into officer and enlisted, then further subdivided into groups of related ratings.

The physical layout of the office itself does not promote interaction. The maze of individual spaces generates a sense of isolationism rather than a sharing environment. Partitions provide privacy while simultaneously stifling openness.

The logic behind the N13 structure is unclear due to a lack of organizational history, however, the structure does not align with the purpose. For example, the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) section is part of N13, yet it does not readily contribute to the overall mission. This may confuse personnel already unsure of the organization’s mission.

Several liaison personnel are used to facilitate interagency coordination. There is an NPRST coordinator (N13C) for external research and analysis, a Policy Analysis expert (N13T), and a Research and Development Project coordinator. According to several long-term members of

N13, a large share of the reduction of N13 personnel came from a Retention section and a Recruiting liaison section. This has placed the few remaining liaison personnel under a tremendous workload, and is likely degrading their ability to accomplish their primary liaison requirements.



**Figure 5-4.** N13 Structure and Internal Coordination

### c. People

N13 does not appear to have the right mix of personnel for the required work. This organization brings together a wide variety of skilled personnel, but many without the skills and experience for this work. Fleet Support Officers (FSO) are the best match for this work because the

manpower and personnel system requires specialized experience and knowledge to understand its complexity. FSOs likely have the education, experience, and career continuity to maintain and improve the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs).

Many N13 personnel come from other Navy communities and are typically placed in community management or Technical Advisor (TechAd) jobs. Although these people may be “frontrunners” in their individual communities, they are not equipped with the necessary KSAs for the complex manpower and personnel system. Their value to N13 is in the recent fleet experience and knowledge of how the policies impact the people. For these officers and enlisted personnel, the manpower and personnel system requires learning completely new tasks, technology, culture, and lingo. Then, just as they begin to understand this new system, they are rotated back to their primary duties. Often times the two or three years spent developing new knowledge and skills during a tour are never used again.

Although a detailed study of the graduate education and subspecialty systems are beyond the scope of this thesis, they play a major role in determining the personnel and quality mix of the organization. This Navy graduate education system is designed to develop officers suited for this type of work and the subspecialty system was developed to ensure that they are utilized. However, this system has been unsuccessful in assigning sufficient officers on payback tours in a timely manner, and it is difficult to measure whether or not the graduate education system develops the necessary KSAs.

#### *d. Processes and Subsystems*

**1. Human Resource Management.** N13 does not have a formal Human Resources Management function. N13’s selection, training, and rewarding of personnel are haphazard and not linked to organization performance. The selection process is left primarily to the distribution system to fill assignments often resulting in gapped billets or people without the appropriate background and skills required.

The training system in N13 is generally acknowledged to be inadequate. Valuable time is being wasted and productivity lost as personnel struggle to learn a new system over a lengthy time period. The outgoing person is generally required to be the “human resource

manager," assigned as sponsor and training coordinator for his or her relief. OJT is relied on almost exclusively to train new personnel. OJT is probably sufficient training for the few already indoctrinated into the manpower and personnel world, however, this bombardment of tasks, processes, and models delivered in an unfamiliar lingo, overwhelms most personnel who do not have the requisite background. This "total immersion" process creates a great deal of stress on new personnel whose goal often shifts from mastering the job to learning "survival techniques."

The primary trait that is rewarded in N13 (and in many other Navy organizations) is the ability to respond quickly and decisively. In other words, "firefighting" skills are sought after and rewarded. Those with the ability to get things done under a lot of stress and who work long hours are esteemed and valued by the organization. Other means of motivation are important, but by the time many senior personnel arrive at N13, they have already assessed their future potential in the Navy. Those on the road to command are probably the most motivated and consistently strong performers. However, once again, the type of behavior rewarded may be linked to N13's problems, i.e., short-term versus strategic thinking, and individual promotion over organizational continuity. Those approaching retirement may be harder to motivate. Even the benefits that are supposed to coincide with seniority are ignored in the Washington environment as senior officers work in "pookas" and fight for a parking spot.

**2. Measurement and Controls.** Organizational performance is measured by whether or not it meets end strength goals, fleet manning levels, and individual retention statistics. Personnel performance is measured primarily by Fitness Reports, which does not necessarily provide an accurate measure of productivity.

N13 personnel have many controls imposed upon them. They must work within the existing guidelines, policies, laws, rules and regulations, which act as system constraints. For instance, the Community Managers work within CNO guidelines for sea-shore rotation and Compensation personnel work within the limits of laws already enacted. These controls often impede the flow of the work and make change difficult to accomplish.

**3. Planning, Communication, and Information Management.** It is common knowledge that minimal long-range planning occurs. This is an organization that reacts to

short-term issues, not long-term planning. This is partly due to downsizing which has resulted in task overload. Personnel will naturally focus on what they need to do to survive immediate crises. Another reason for short-sightedness is a lack of continuity and community "ownership" due to rapid turnover and shortened assignments. Personnel that are not expecting to be in the organization in the years ahead would naturally have difficulty integrating strategic perspective.

Communication is important to the N13 organization. N13 relies on a range of communication mediums to coordinate work. E-mail, multiple phone lines, fax, VTC, and the Internet serve N13 fairly well, particularly in a downsizing environment. These communication mediums facilitate a demanding workload, but extensive face-to-face communications are still required. Face-to-face has been shown to be the most effective means of communication, followed by e-mail, and telephone.<sup>68</sup> N13 relies extensively on face-to-face communication, which is a primary reason why the organization remained behind in Washington, D.C. There is currently a great deal of concern at all levels of the BUPERS organization about the move of Pers-4 to Millington. N13 and Pers-4 require a great deal of interaction in determining how the policies affect individuals in the fleet. This move separates the implementers of plans and policy from the executors by 850 miles and will undoubtedly result in communication problems.

There is also an acknowledged problem with the information systems and models in both N13 and the entire manpower and personnel system. Information systems should be a tremendous asset to N13 personnel, however they mostly add to the confusion. There is a model for nearly every function, however, a lack of training, accurate data, and understanding of the models contribute to confusion and misuse. The models are reliant on data that cannot be relied on for accuracy, which adds a degree of uncertainty on the results. The general lack of understanding of how the models work can be traced to the training and selection of personnel not equipped with necessary analysis tools. The training is limited to OJT and occasional group training. For an untrained person these models appear overwhelming, and alternative methods often emerge to solve

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<sup>68</sup> Linda Trevino, et al., "Understanding Managers' Media Choices: A Symbolic Interaction Perspective," Readings in Managerial Communications, edited by Gail Fann Thomas, Jim Suchan, and Bob Barrios-Choplin, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Simon and Schuster Custom Publishing: Needham Heights, MA, 1997, pp. 36-38.

recurring problems. The fact that several Community Managers have developed their own spreadsheets, bypassing existing models, speaks volumes.

## 5. Culture

The Navy culture has a tremendous affect on this organization. The people of N13 are mostly long time members of the Navy and have strong loyalty to their service and individual communities. This “culture” is one that prides an officer on being able to overcome the most difficult of circumstances through sheer force and determination. An officer is trained from day one to make the best of difficult situations without complaining. A common measure of success is being able to take a program in disrepair and turn it around. This is a group of officers accustomed to taking a new job every two or three years, with a typical “you’ve got it- go figure it out” turnover. It is not seen as abnormal that the first six months to a year in the organization is spent trying to figure out how to do the job, because this is a trend these officers have seen throughout their careers. Generally speaking, it is the brute force and effort of the individual officer that determines how well the job is to be done.

N13 is a “melting pot” of Navy communities and their associated cultures. A generally desired characteristic of a Navy officer is to be good at “putting out fires.” The Navy tends to develop and reward those that operate best under stress. This “firefighting” mentality is present in N13, as personnel are overloaded with tasks, have no clear direction, and are forced to prioritize issues based on operational and administrative overload.

The Navy also has shaped its culture through periodic job rotation. This process enforces learning the rules for survival, dealing with short-term issues, and making incremental changes. The initial stress of being thrust into unfamiliar surroundings results in a “survival instinct” where an officer will use all means available to appear proficient in a new job. They know that any long range planning will not affect them, and therefore will tend to avoid it. Military personnel are seen as people who are trying to make their mark quickly. The rotation system develops people with a mandate to do something to become visible in the eyes of superiors.<sup>69</sup> Officers are also generally

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<sup>69</sup> Carolyn Ban, "How Do Public Managers Manage? Bureaucratic Constraints, Organizational Culture, and the Potential for Reform." Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995, p.33.

conditioned to avoid a system change, because this results in more work and invalidates the hard effort spent mastering the existing system.

*a. Outputs and Outcomes*

N13 has three primary customer specific outputs. For Congress, the output is in reaching end strength limits by the end of the fiscal year and by having a Navy manned to meet all current threats. While meeting end strength requirements is a concrete, measurable output, measuring the capability of that force includes subjectivity. The output to the Fleet is officer and enlisted community manning levels. An erroneous assumption behind these indicators is that manning levels are reflective of the size of the force that is needed. From the individual perspective, the output is in plans and policies that are designed to encourage retention, planned separation, and recruitment. This is measured primarily by retention and recruiting numbers. This performance indicator is "time-late," and does not explain the reasons behind individual actions. This indicator generally leads to reactionary behavior from manpower and personnel managers as they attempt to increase numbers primarily with monetary incentives.


Serving three customers results in stakeholders who are rarely satisfied, and if they are, that satisfaction is fleeting. When attention is focused primarily on those with the worst problems, the others suffer due to lack of attention. Desired outcomes include the following: Congress wants full mission accomplishment and a large shore infrastructure that costs less; Fleet Admirals want more technology, hardware, personnel, and training to perform missions; and Naval personnel want reduced operation tempo and better quality of life. A persistent outcome is low retention, recruiting shortfalls, and indications of an emerging hollow force.

## C. CURRENT CONFIGURATION

### 1. Mintzberg Model

The individual components of the N13 system comprise its depiction as an organizational configuration. Mintzberg's basic structural model is useful when describing the current shape. Downsizing has impacted the operating core, technostucture, and support staff. The strategic apex and middle line were left largely intact in order to maintain the current branch structure, while the

Strength Planning and Officer Career Development sections, in particular, have been substantially reduced by personnel cuts. **Figure (5-5)** is one view of N13 using Mintzberg's basic structural model.




**Figure 5-5.** Mintzberg's Structural Model Applied to N13

Mintzberg's model depicts N13 as an organization out of balance. The operating core, while significantly reduced, has had to take on added duties of support and the technostructure. These personnel must now perform many of the analysis functions and administrative work that detracts from their primary duties. Prior to the drawdown, an entire retention shop consisting of approximately 20 persons handled data analysis. This function still needs to be performed as retention and attrition are critical to N13's mission. Analysis can still be performed, but not without a cost to already overloaded personnel. The support staff is also too small to handle the existing administrative functions. Many officers now handle these functions themselves, distracting them from their primary duties.

## 2. Configuration model

The Public Sector Configuration model places organizations into one of four configurations depending on the level of efficiency and effectiveness found in an organization. Analysis places N13 in the political-reactive quadrant as shown in **Figure (5-5)**.



**Figure 5-6.** N13's Current Organizational Configuration

N13 responds to stakeholder interests in an ad hoc manner, depending on who has the strongest influence. With its three primary stakeholders and associated outputs, it is an organization that must constantly shift priorities and focus its resources on whoever is demanding the most attention. This forces N13 into the role of “firefighter” and helps explain why this type of organization struggles with both efficiency and effectiveness.

It is difficult for leadership to develop a meaningful vision or far-reaching goals for the organization as it gets pushed and pulled by its primary stakeholders. Plans and policies are often made in response to certain events or crises, which results in an inability to implement plans for the future.

The Systems and Configuration models are useful for analyzing an organization because they focus on the overall system, including the internal and external factors affecting it. These

models applied to N13 show an organization in an uncertain, political environment, lacking clear direction. Coupled with drastic personnel reductions and the relocation of a large part of the BUPERS organization to Tennessee, N13 struggles to adapt and perform in a constraint oriented external environment and a misaligned internal structure. Old solutions (more money and personnel) are no longer readily available. N13 faces the considerable challenge of formulating and implementing innovative solutions incongruent with its current system design factors.

The analysis provided here should not contain any surprising revelations to those familiar with the organization. Rather, the models provide a framework for viewing the organization as a system of interrelated components and also in terms of the level of efficiency and effectiveness. N13, and other similarly stressed and stretched Navy organizations, can either continue to struggle within the confines of the present organizational design or begin to develop a strategy and plan for change. Application of the Systems and Configuration models can be particularly helpful to leaders and managers seeking improved organizations.

## **VI. A FUTURE VISION FOR N13**

This thesis has described the “current reality” of the N13 organization. Application of the Systems and Configuration models in the previous chapter shows areas for improvement in the individual components as well as the entire system. This is an important first step in the change process. Leaders seeking change must first have a clear picture of where their organization is today, in order to make plans for tomorrow.

This chapter describes a “future vision” for N13 with recommendations to begin movement toward a new direction. My vision is that an organizational transformation could begin in N13 that could serve as a model for change throughout the Manpower and Personnel system. The conclusions and recommendations offered here are not meant to be conclusive, but are meant to open dialogue among leaders and managers on ways to improve performance.

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

The limitations of this study are discussed prior to drawing conclusions to put them in proper perspective. To thoroughly understand an organization requires in-depth knowledge at many levels. One week spent in Washington learning about the N13 organization is not long enough to conduct a complete organizational assessment. This thesis is basically a preliminary analysis of the entire organization and its conclusions are based on a limited number of interviews, and limited archival information. Information obtained from sixteen semi-structured interviews and seven Enlisted Community Managers’ questionnaires provided only a rudimentary snapshot of the organization. Conclusions and recommendations may not represent diverse organizational perspectives due to the small sample size.

The following three clusters of conclusions are critical to understanding N13’s current context and the areas where change is required.

- The Systems model used to analyze N13’s context, strategy, design elements, culture, outputs, and outcomes describes a reactive organization. The social, economic and political environment facing N13 is uncertain and complex rather than predictable and

stable. This context has contributed to an organization with no clear direction or strategy. The system design elements have emerged incongruently rather than explicitly. The structure does not support the primary mission or teamwork, and the technology and tasks are complex, undefined, and not standardized. Many of the people do not possess the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) for the work and there is no formal human resources management system to adequately select, train, or reward personnel. The communication mediums are not fully exploited for the coordination required and the long range planning is almost nonexistent. The information systems and models are generally out-dated, incompatible with other systems, and tend to add to the confusion.

- The Configuration model places N13 into the relatively inefficient and ineffective quadrant termed Political-Reactive. The organization uses its limited resources to handle the most pressing issues, one at a time, which forces it into a “firefighter” role. The Mintzberg model depicts N13 as an organization out of balance. The recent drawdown has significantly reduced the technostructure, the operating core, and liaison personnel, while basically maintaining middle and senior management structure.
- The application of the Systems and Configuration models shows that change is needed to improve efficiency and effectiveness in N13, if it is to shift out of the Political-Reactive configuration.

## B. ASSUMPTIONS

The following recommendations are based on several assumptions. First, it is assumed that Navy manning will generally remain the same or perhaps decrease slightly. The Cold War era is a fading memory and it is up to the remaining personnel to develop initiatives to better utilize the available personnel. The Smart Ship program is an example of how personnel can be reduced without a noticeable decrease in performance. The majority of the personnel reductions in the

Smart Ship program came from philosophical changes in ship policy and not technological change.<sup>70</sup> Second, N13 is limited in terms of the scope and magnitude of implementing meaningful change due to realities, such as officer career paths, the subspecialty system, and fiscal constraints. Recommendations addressing some of these issues are made for Manpower and Personnel leadership. Third, it is assumed that BUPERS organizations that have already moved to Tennessee will not return to Washington D.C.

The leadership in the organization should consider change strategies using the Systems model as a framework. The recommendations summarized in **Table (6-1)** are starting points for dialogue, and are based on some perceived weaknesses and/or inefficiencies that may need more immediate attention.

### C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR N13

The scope of this thesis is limited to describing and analyzing the current N13 organization. Results show that change is needed if N13 is to become more efficient and effective. Developing a "future vision" is an important step in the change process. N13 leadership should develop a realistic yet challenging vision that can focus the organization towards attainable improvements. The vision, or clearly communicated direction, would have to be linked to specific actions. For example, if the direction included a team approach to anticipating and solving relevant manpower and personnel problems, then teams would have to be established, trained, and rewarded. The remainder of this section concentrates on recommendations for change.

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<sup>70</sup> Doug Brinkley, "Smart Ship Assessment: Ship's Perspective", Briefing at Naval Postgraduate School, 13 July 1998.

SYSTEM AREA	N13 CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS
STRATEGY/ DIRECTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Set a new direction, under umbrella of N1 direction.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement strategic thinking. Formulate and communicate a meaningful, relevant strategy for improving performance aligned with higher direction.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine the type of changes required (restructure, process improvement, training).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a consensus for change</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek solutions that focus on individual and organizational improvements.</li> </ul>
DESIGN FACTORS	<i>Need to be congruent.</i>
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analyze the existing structure for alignment with mission accomplishment. Divest non-core mission areas.</li> <li>Consider using teams to maximize impact of stretched personnel.</li> </ul>
Structure/ Teams	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Boldly eliminate “pookas” and create atmosphere of sharing and openness.</li> <li>Use Fleet Support officers as manpower experts to manage the communities.</li> <li>Use Community liaison officers to provide fleet perspective on teams incorporating fleet feedback.</li> <li>Use civilians on teams to maximize continuity, perform data entry and secretarial functions.</li> <li>Create a single branch for all Fleet/Community support functions.</li> </ul>
Tasks / Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider process redesign and development of metrics to determine accomplishment of desired outcomes.</li> </ul>
Human Resource Mgmt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a HRM/Training Coordination Section to capture lessons learned, initiate critical training, and reward desired behaviors.</li> </ul>
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Design an individualized training program providing standardized and/or emerging needs.</li> </ul>
Selection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proactive involvement in the process to ensure the best possible job match under the current distribution system constraints.</li> </ul>
Rewards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Update traditional reward system to motivate desired behaviors.</li> </ul>

Table 6-1. Summary of Change Recommendations for N13

## 1. Strategy Development

### a. *Strategy formulation must involve senior leaders and process owners.*

N13 needs to develop a clear direction for the organization that is meaningful, relevant, and inspiring. Caution applies. Mere promulgation of a “traditional” vision/mission/goals statement without linkage to direct actions will not stimulate needed change. Leaders must “carve

out” time for strategic thinking, communicate a platform or reason for change, then involve themselves in the ongoing more difficult process of implementation. They should consider a strategic issues management approach where problems and opportunities are explicitly mapped based on importance and urgency, and actions are assigned and tracked.<sup>71</sup> The direction for N13 needs to be aligned with the system direction given by N1.

*b. Determine the type of change required and how to implement it.*

Whether strategic or incremental change is required, either will require a coordinated plan, developed by using all available expertise. As discussed in Chapter II, “generative” learning should be cultivated through dialogue to seek new and innovative solutions to emerging challenges and opportunities. Generative change is difficult but might allow N13 to “leap frog” ahead of anticipated problems.

*c. Develop a consensus for change.*

It is essential to have a critical mass of support from the organization before implementing change. Top-down directed change often fails if organization members do not perceive the need for change or if they question management’s sincerity for follow-through beyond rhetoric. For instance, the Navy’s initiative to adopt Total Quality Management (TQM) principles in the early 1990s, met with only limited success due to, among other things, problems with implementation. In summary, organizational learning is critical if N13 is serious about improving its performance in meaningful ways. Developing consensus starts by accurately communicating the organization’s reality to all relevant members.

*d. Seek solutions that focus on the individual.*

N13’s primary mission should be meeting the personal needs (i.e., career, compensation, etc.) of the individual sailors and officers. N13’s location near Congress and the Pentagon, and the Pers-4 (Distribution) move to Tennessee will concentrate N13’s focus on

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid. pp. 104-129.

Congressional and Fleet needs to the detriment of individual sailors and officers. N13 should consider moving to Tennessee, and possibly integrating the detailers into a team-based design. The close coordination required between the Community Managers and detailers may not be sustainable given the 850 mile separation. N13 must address this critical communication gap if it intends to maintain or improve service and coordination.

## **2. N13 Design Factors**


Organizational change involves manipulating the system design elements. Congruence among the system components must be considered when making changes. N13 leadership faces the challenging task of understanding how changing individual components impacts the system. The following recommendations are intended to begin a dialogue for change within N13. Each component must be considered individually and systematically.

### *a. Structure.*

**(1) Restructure to support the primary mission of N13.** The current structure of N13 is incongruent with the mission and does not support the lateral coordination and mutual adjustment required. While limited in scope and detail, **Figure (6-1)** is one possible framework for restructuring.

The proposed structure requires looking at the organization from a new perspective. The basic duties presently being done would be very similar, but with a clearer sense of unity, purpose, responsibilities, and teamwork. The recommended restructuring would serve to eliminate some of the middle line positions and shift the balance of the organization back to the operating core, which is a major strength of the organization.

**(2) The physical layout of the office should promote an atmosphere of sharing and openness.** “Pookas” should be eliminated or modified to provide a more open space that promotes interaction and teamwork. This physical layout rearrangement would need to include affected personnel in the proposal stages, and would need to offer a better work environment. Unless “pooka-mentality” is dealt with, a culture based on teamwork will probably not transpire.



**Figure 6-1.** Possible Team-based Restructuring of N13.

**(3) The branches should be reconfigured to align with the mission.**

Consider merging the Officer and Enlisted Policy branches and subdividing into broad communities. This configuration would promote an encompassing fleet concept. While this idea is likely to draw criticism due to the common paradigm of separating officer and enlisted in all respects, synergy and efficiency may need to dominate over tradition if out-of-the-box changes are to be realized. The other branch would be the Community Support branch, whose function would be to support the primary branch of the organization through lateral coordination with the various communities. N13 needs to divest non-core mission areas in order to focus on the primary purpose of the organization, for example, Personnel Exchange Program (PEP).

**(4) N13 should consider using teams to concentrate performance degraded by personnel reductions.** Teams could be used to manage an entire community (e.g., Surface, Aviation, Submarine) including both officer and enlisted personnel. While some variation will obviously be required, a sharing of ideas and standardization of procedures should eventually increase efficiency as redundancy is reduced, and increase effectiveness as teams learn to focus on fleet and organizational objectives.

A Fleet Support Officer (FSO) should be assigned “team leader” for the overall management of their communities and coordination between the support functions. These FSOs would be the resident manpower experts. They would be supported by fleet liaison personnel who would contribute to the team by providing a fleet perspective and feedback on plans and policies. The officer liaison would act as an assistant to the team leader (Officer Plans) and gradually develop an understanding of the manpower system while providing fleet expertise. Enlisted liaisons would serve as Technical Advisors (TechAds), similar to their present role, but with a key difference being the role as advisors rather than analysts. Civilians should be incorporated into the teams to provide much needed administrative support and continuity. They would be used for data entry and secretarial functions that will allow the planners and policy makers time to focus on their primary duties. The Community Support branch should also be more team-oriented, integrating officer and enlisted functions, such as end strength planning.

***b. Tasks and Technology***

N13 should consider process redesign and development of metrics to determine accomplishment of desired outputs and outcomes. Tasks will then need to be redesigned around the improved and/or new processes. Many of the processes used by N13 are repeated periodically during a day, week, month, or year. Knowledge of the processes and tasks should not be dependent on a verbal passdown. These need to be documented, standardized, and incorporated into a training program.

***c. Human Resource Management***

N13 needs to create a HRM/Training Coordination Section to provide for the selection, training, and rewarding of personnel. The primary function would be to initiate a critical

training program, capture lessons learned, and reward desired behaviors. A customized training program needs to be designed to facilitate the indoctrination of personnel with varying backgrounds. The current method of OJT adversely affects morale and productivity as employees spend months learning to cope.

Due to the small size of the command, a full training department would not be feasible; however, this function can not be overlooked. A senior person, perhaps with a year remaining in the command, should be assigned the job of HRM (Training) Coordination Section Head as a primary duty. This section would be responsible for ensuring that each incoming individual receives a personalized job-specific training program based on their previous experience and skill level. A training syllabus could be provided to the individual supplemented with OJT. Other means of training should be incorporated to ensure that each new person is provided the knowledge needed to quickly become a productive member of the organization, i.e., training on teamwork.

N13 leadership should actively involve themselves in the selection process to ensure the best possible job matches under the constraints of the current distribution system. This would require a proactive approach and systematic communications with the detailers, placement officers, and the job candidates themselves.

The traditional reward system should be updated to motivate desired behaviors. Effective and innovative ways to motivate and reward excellence in performance for both teams and individuals should be part of this organization. Ask organization members what rewards and incentives are most meaningful to them.

#### **D. AREAS FOR FUTHER RESEARCH**

This study analyzed N13 and provided generalized linkage with the overall manpower and personnel system. The following areas would benefit from further research studies.

- **Conduct an organizational analysis on the overall manpower and personnel system.** N13 is semi-autonomous in that the entire manpower and personnel system affects its ability to operate efficiently and effectively. System-wide problems complicate change initiatives in any

one organization, because the geographically dispersed autonomous organizations function themselves as a complex system. The Navy has operated its manpower and personnel system in much the same fashion for many decades evolving incrementally in response to national security and political pressures.

The systems approach could be used to stimulate even wider, more fundamental changes to Navy manpower. Multiple design factors would need to be analyzed for the purpose of aligning the missions of multiple agencies. No small task, however, the field and timing may be ripe for Navy-wide changes.

- **Conduct an organizational analysis of Pers-4.** This area is a logical follow-on to this study and should be centered on the affects of the move to Millington, Tennessee, personnel reductions, and loss of face-to-face communications between detailers and community managers. Lessons learned from the move, current problems, and possible solutions would need to be documented and added to the findings of this study.
- **Analyze the personnel requirements of the manpower and personnel system.** The findings of the thesis expose this area of concern in N13, which likely applies to the entire manpower and personnel system. Further research could be conducted to determine:
  - to what extent is the selection, training, and experience of FSOs suitable to the demands of manpower and personnel management and decision-making?
  - what ratio of FSO to URL/RL/Staff officers best fits the requirements?

## E. A FINAL WORD

These recommendations are intended to start a dialogue for change primarily within N13, but also within the manpower and personnel system. The recommendations are a starting point for introducing needed change based on a realistic organizational assessment. This thesis has described the “current reality” of the N13 organization, and its relationship, although briefly, to the overall Naval manpower system. It is incumbent upon the leadership to provide the strategy, direction, communication, and means to implement needed change. Past ways of doing business are a luxury no longer readily available. Systemic change implies an understanding of direction, design, and

culture, all within the complexity of a political environment. New and innovative solutions to emerging problems and challenges are both possible and doable.



## **APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF TERMS\***

**ACTIVITY MANPOWER DOCUMENT (AMD):** The qualitative and quantitative expression of manpower requirements (military, civilian, and contractor) and authorizations (military) allocated to a naval activity to perform the assigned MFTs or ROC/POEs. It has the following uses and applications:

- a. As an expression of manpower needs of an activity, it is the authority used by CHNAVPERS and the applicable Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office to provide requisite military personnel distribution and Naval Reserve recall.
- b. It is the basic document for current and future peacetime and mobilization Navy military manpower planning in the areas of personnel strength planning, recruiting, training, promotion, personnel distribution, and the naval reserve recall.
- c. It is the single official statement of organizational manning and manpower authorizations (BA).

**ADDITIONAL DUTY (ADDU):** Part-time functional requirements to which an individual is assigned, and which is in addition to the primary duty. The duty may or may not be at the permanent duty station. Such additional duty should not normally require less than 50 percent of the incumbent's time.

**AUTHORIZATION (AUTH):** Manpower requirement supported by appropriate funding or meeting other established criteria.

**BILLETS AUTHORIZED (BA):** A billet for which funding has been provided for the military manpower space and for which the quality has been authorized by CNO as a requirement to perform the billet functions.

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\* Source: OPNAVINST 1000.16J and NPRDC ECM Tutorial

**CHAIN OF COMMAND:** The succession of offices from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

**DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT (DOPMA):** Congressional legislation controlling military officer communities, specifically with respect to officer paygrades O-4 and above.

**DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (DPG):** Document in which SECDEF issue broad guidance to the services, describing the defense objectives to be supported by the forces required to counter that threat.

**END STRENGTH:** The number of officers and enlisted requirements which can be authorized (funded) based on approved budgets. End strength is set forth for each activity in the FYDP.

**ENLISTED COMMUNITY MANAGER (ECM):** Enlisted community managers (ECMs) are responsible for managing the “health and welfare” and career development plans of enlisted ratings, rates, and NECs within the manager’s purview.

**ENLISTED PROGRAMMED AUTHORIZATIONS (EPA):** A recurring, published document summarizing enlisted authorizations contained in TFMMS. The EPA projects planned authorizations for current and future fiscal years.

**FLEET MANPOWER DOCUMENT (FMD):** Displays, in detail, quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements of a sea duty activity or a sea duty activity with shore duty component(s) that are operationally dependent upon one another and include operational units other than ships or squadrons. Requirements are predicated on a ROC statement under a POE, specified operating profile, computed workload and established doctrinal constraints.

**FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP):** The official program that summarizes SECDEF-approved plans and programs for DoD. The FYDP is published at least annually. The FYDP is also represented by a computer database, which is updated regularly to reflect budget decisions reprogramming actions.

**MANNING CONTROL AUTHORITY (MCA):** In the enlisted distribution system, the MCA is the naval authority who is tasked with determining the quantity, quality, and priority for assignment of personnel to all requirements within activities for which personnel distribution responsibilities have been assigned. This is accomplished by establishing priorities in the requisition system, monitoring assignments, and initiating actions to correct manning personnel deficiencies.

**MANPOWER CLAIMANT (MC):** In the Resource Management System, the major commanders or bureaus that are authorized manpower resources directly by CNO for the accomplishment of the assigned missions and tasks.

**MANPOWER REQUIREMENT:** The minimum quantitative and qualitative resource needed to perform a specific mission, function, or task.

**NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATION (NEC):** The Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) code system supplements the enlisted rating structure in identifying special skills held by enlisted personnel and unique billet requirements in manpower authorizations.

**OFFICER PROGRAMMED AUTHORIZATIONS (OPA):** A recurring, published document projecting planned officer authorizations for current and future fiscal years (budget and program years). Planned authorizations are summarized by designator and paygrade within designator for each FY and controlled precisely to the approved end strength for each of the FYs.

**PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS):** Assists the CNO and SECNAV in making decisions regarding the allocation of Navy resources. A formalized procedure by which strategy is developed in consideration of the threat. Force requirements are developed to support the strategy; programs are developed to provide over a period of time the ships, aircraft, weapons systems and manpower for the force requirements. Programs are reviewed for execution, estimates are refined and funds are budgeted to obtain the required manpower and weapon systems. At the DON level the system produces inputs to the DoD planning process, the DON POM, DON budget estimates and DON input to the President's budget.

**PROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (POE):** The environment in which the ship or squadron is expected to operate, including the military climate (e.g., at sea, at war, capable of continuous operations at readiness Condition III).

**REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (ROC):** Statements prepared by mission and warfare sponsors which detail the capabilities required of ships and squadrons in various operational situations. The level of detail sets forth which weapons will be ready at varying degrees of readiness (e.g., perform anti-air warfare with full capability in condition of readiness III).

**RESOURCE SPONSOR:** OPNAV Principle Official responsible for an identifiable aggregation of resources which constitute inputs to warfare and supporting tasks. The span of responsibility includes interrelated programs of parts of programs located in several mission areas.

**SHIP MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SMD):** Quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements for an individual ship or class of ships and the rationale for determination of the requirements. Requirements are predicted upon a ROC/POE, ship configuration, specified operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints such as standard workweeks, leave policy, etc.

**SHORE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS:** Claimant-approved quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements for a naval shore activity.

**SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT (SOMD):** Quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements for an individual aviation squadron or a class of squadrons and the rationale for the determination of the manpower requirements. Manpower requirements are predicted upon statements of ROC/POE, aircraft configuration, specified operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints.

**SUBORDINATE MANPOWER CLAIMANT (SMC):** A command or activity immediately subordinate to the manpower claimant.

**TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TFMMS):** The single, authoritative database for total force manpower requirements, and active duty MPN/RPN manpower authorizations and end strength. Provides storage and retrieval of historical, current, budget, and out-year manpower data. TFMMS provides access to current manpower data for resource sponsors, claimants, subclaimants, and others and provides storage and retrieval of transaction history.



## **APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

- N1B Deputy, Chief of Naval Personnel  
N13 Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division  
N13B Deputy Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division  
N130B Head, Policy Coordination Section  
N130D2 Asst Bonus Programs  
N130J3 Career Information Team  
N131 Head, Officer Plans and Policy Branch  
N131V Aviation Officer Community Manager  
N131W SWO Officer Community Manager  
N131E Head, Officer Career Development Section  
N132B/D Deputy Director, Enlisted Plans and Policy Branch / Head Enlisted Community Manager  
N132C Head, Enlisted Strength Plans  
N132D1 Aviation Mech Enlisted Community Manager  
N132D1A Asst Aviation Mech Enlisted Community Manager  
N132D6 Surface Ops Enlisted Community Manager  
N133C1 Data / Research Analyst  
N13T Policy Analysis and Evaluation  
N122E Head, Manpower Analysis/Accounting Section  
N122E1C Management Analyst  
N122E2 Enlisted Analyst



## **APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL\***

This interview is being conducted as part of the research for my masters' thesis. I am conducting an organizational and process analysis of N13. The primary purpose of my research is to analyze the structure, processes, information systems, and both internal and external relationships.

The results of this interview will be used in explaining this organization works and where it fits into the overall Manpower, Personnel, and Training system. Anything said would remain confidential. I would like to record this interview.

### **Background**

1. What is your career background? How long have you been in this position? Did you ask to come here?

### **Mission & Structure**

2. What would you say is the overall purpose of N13?
3. What are your responsibilities?
4. Can you explain to me the logic behind how the organization is set up the way it is? Is there something here that you don't think belongs? Is there anything that you think should be here with this organization?
5. What would you say are the "inputs" to N13 in terms of information and resources?
6. What would you say are the "outputs" of this organization?
7. Who depends on these outputs?
8. What individuals or organizations have an impact on getting your job done?
9. How are decisions made here (i.e., meetings, top down)?
10. Would you describe your organization as being basically autonomous or is it an organization with a lot of interdependence on other agencies? How well does this seem to work?
11. How do you spend the majority of your time during a typical day?

### **Information Technology**

12. What are the information systems that are used by this organization?

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\* This interview protocol was used as a basic framework. Each interview was specifically tailored to the interviewee.

13. Are you able to get the information you need in order to make decisions? What information would you like to see that you aren't able to now?

**People & Rewards**

14. What type of specific training did you receive for this job?

15. How long would you estimate that it would take someone to learn what they need to know in order to do their job?

16. To what extent is turnover a problem in this organization?

17. What kind of behavior would you like to see more of from your subordinates? Less of?

18. How is success measured around here?

**Miscellaneous**

19. If you were Admiral for a day and could change three things in this organization, what would they be?

20. Is there anything you can think of that I should be asking in order for me to understand this organization?

21. Do you have anything else you'd like to add?

## **APPENDIX D. ECM QUESTIONNAIRE**

- (1) How long have you been a community manager? What communities are you responsible for?
- (2) What, if any, manpower and personnel experience did you have before coming to this job?  
How long did it take for you to get comfortable with this job?
- (3) Do you have a copy of the NPRDC ECM Tutorial (1994)? Did you ever use it? If so, how well does it describe the way you do business? If you don't use it, why not?
- (4) Very briefly, how do you do "A" and "C" school and advancement planning? Do you use the available models or do you basically go by past experience or some other method?
- (5) Is there a standardized method for doing Community Management? Should (or could) there be?
- (6) Are you satisfied with the models you have available? What would you like to be able to do that you aren't able to?
- (7) Do you feel that you were given adequate training for this job? If not, what would you recommend for new ECMs?
- (8) Which agencies do you coordinate with most?
- (9) How do you spend the majority of your time during the week?



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